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Bonfield on State Administrative
Rulemaking: A Critique
Carl A. Auerbach*
Despite the pioneering scholarship and pedagogical efforts
of Frank Goodenow and Ernst Freund in the 1890s and early

1900s, administrative law came late to the American Law
School.' It was not until after World War II that a Harvard
Law School student could take a course in administrative law
for credit towards the LL.B. degree. Before then, Professor Felix Frankfurter offered administrative law as a Harvard Law
School seminar for graduate students, to which third year students were admitted by special permission. Kenneth Culp Davis informs me that he never received any instruction in
administrative law at Harvard because during his third year
Professor Frankfurter was away at Oxford.
When administrative law was finally admitted to the law
school curriculum, it came in federal dress, which it has not significantly changed to this day. The teaching and study of federal administrative law has flourished. 2 But there is no
casebook in print dealing exclusively or significantly with state
administrative law. Few law schools teach the subject. The
scholarly resources devoted to it are meager. Most of the writing in state administrative law is for the purposes of continuing
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. See generally W. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT (1982).
2. The 1939-40 Directory of Law Teachers in member schools of the Association of American Law Schools lists 80 teachers of administrative law in 78
schools. See A. AM. L. SCH., DIRECTORY OF TEACHERS IN MEMBER SCHOOLS
1939-40 (1939). Only eight were listed as having taught the subject for more
than 10 years. See id. James M. Landis reported that of the eight, two were
active only in the Philippine Islands, two were part-time teachers and only
four were regular members of law school faculties. Landis, CrucialIssues in
Administrative Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1078, 1079-80 (1940). The 1985-86 Directory lists 638 teachers of administrative law, of whom 105 have taught the
subject for more than 10 years. See A. AM. L. SCH., DIRECTORY OF LAW
TEACHERS 1985-86 (1985). The teachers of state administrative law are not
listed separately.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:543

legal education. Frank E. Cooper's work 3 has no successor.
Those who, like myself, think that state administrative law
should be studied and taught owe thanks to Professors Arthur
Earl Bonfield and Harold L. Levinson, the scholarly ReportersDraftsmen of the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure
Act (Model Act) proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, pertinent provisions of
which are set out in the Appendix.4 Bonfield's book, State AdministrativeRule Making,5 is the first major work dealing with
the Model Act. It should be followed by a volume on state administrative adjudication. Bonfield's book admirably accomplishes its dual purpose-to stimulate the teaching and study of
state administrative law and to persuade state legislatures to
6
adopt the Model Act.
Bonfield does not approach his subject from the standpoint
of the procedural acts now governing administrative rulemaking in the fifty states and their interpretation and application
by the fifty state courts. Instead, the book is intended to propose and analyze, "in a comprehensive and detailed way, an
ideal system of procedures for the governance of state agency
law making."7 In actuality, it is an exposition and justification
of the Model Act, which Bonfield apparently regards as "ideal"
in view of the few disagreements with its provisions that he expresses. In the process of his exposition, Bonfield compares the
1981 Model Act with the various state administrative procedure
acts, the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (FAPA) 8 and
the 1961 Model State Administrative Procedure Act. In the
course of evaluating their respective merits, Bonfield manages
to discuss and illuminate the major current issues of administrative rulemaking.
Bonfield's evaluation unfolds by asking which procedures
for administrative rulemaking best accommodate the "comprehensive rationality model" of administrative rulemaking with
3.
4.

F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1965).
MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1981) [hereinafter

MODEL ACT]. Principal provisions of the Model Act discussed in this Article
are appended at pp. 588-610 infra.
5. A. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING (1986).
6. Scholars must also begin to pay attention to the administrative law of
municipal and county agencies. But I agree with Bonfield that "the problems
of dealing with both state and local agencies in one statutory scheme are insurmountable." Id. at 47.
7. Id. at 15.
8. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
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the "political" model 9 and the need for "workable, effective, efu0
The
ficient, and economical government administration."
comprehensive rationality model, which Bonfield accepts as
embodying the "ideal" toward which administrative procedure
should strive,"L
demands not only a precise specification of the goals of agency law
making and a clear identification of all alternative means by which
those goals may be realized; it also requires a careful, complete, and
technically sophisticated consideration of all the consequences of each
of those alternatives, followed by an agency decision.32

The political model "creates, and makes effective, opportunities
for public political pressures to shape the product of administrative law making, and to prevent agencies from adopting law
that is unacceptable to the current interest group balance of
power in the community at large"' 3 no matter "how lawful,
technically sound, and reasonable a particular administrative
policy may be.' 4 It subordinates the "will of the agency experts... to the will of the people."' 5
It is difficult to evaluate the respective merits of different
administrative procedure acts by the criteria Bonfield proposes.
In one of the most interesting chapters in the book, however,
Bonfield undertakes to assess the overall costs and benefits of
16
the Model Act from the point of view of these criteria. Difficult as this task is, it is even more difficult to assess the relative
costs and benefits of different provisions in different administrative procedure acts dealing with the same particular subject
matter.
Bonfield recognizes that "scientific" assessments are impos9. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 4-11.
10. I& at 9.
11. Id at 7.
12. Id. at 6. Bonfield opposes the comprehensive rationality model to the
incrementalist model, under which agencies make law in the course of adjudicating particular cases. See id. at 5. He also opposes the technocratic model to
the "political" model. See id. at 8-9. In this opposition, the technocratic model
requires that agency lawmaking be "effectively insulated from everyday public
political pressures" lest "it thwart the proper resolution of problems by the official experts." Id at 8. But expert or technocratic lawmaking would be expert only to the extent it sought to follow the comprehensive rationality
model. I shall use the terms "comprehensive rationality" and "technocratic"
interchangeably. The extent to which the comprehensive rationality or technocratic model should yield to political pressures is a separate question.
13. Id at 9.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id at 441-52.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:543

sible, but that reliable empirical data would help. 17 Alas, such
data are lacking and their lack points to one of the greatest deficiencies in contemporary administrative law scholarship.
Conclusions as to which administrative procedures best accommodate the comprehensive rationality and political models,
therefore, require close judgment calls and Bonfield does not
shirk them. Bonfield defends them "primarily on the basis of
certain value choices and the quality of the arguments maru8
shalled to support them.'
I shall follow Bonfield's example in evaluating the Model
Act's major rulemaking procedures and his justifications of
them. I shall confine myself to the comparison between the
Model Act and FAPA.
I. THE DEFINITION OF RULEMAKING AND
ADJUDICATION
Like FAPA, the Model Act's procedures for rulemaking
differ fundamentally from those for adjudication and so the
definitions of the two processes of agency lawmaking are crucial. Unlike FAPA, the Model Act defines as an "order" and
not a "rule" all agency statements of particular applicability
(those addressed to named or specified parties), even if they involve "the approval or prescription for the future of rates,
wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances
therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing."' 9 Consequently, under the Model
Act, the procedures for adjudication, not rulemaking, would
govern such agency action. But the FAPA definitions assume
that rulemaking procedures are better suited to such action,
which "is primarily concerned with policy considerations" 20 and
does not involve the determination of evidentiary facts concerning a single person's past conduct, "as to which the veracity and
demeanor of witnesses would often be important."'2 '
Although we may agree with Bonfield that the Model Act's
definitions are far more defensible than are FAPA's "from an
17.
18.
19.
MODEL

See id at 443-44.
Id. at 443.
Compare Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (6) with
ACT, supra note 4, § 1-102(5), (10), Appendix p. 588 infra.

20. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE [FED.
ERAL] ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 14 (1947).

21.

Id.
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analytic point of view," 22 it does not follow that adjudicative
procedures are necessarily best for all kinds of adjudication.
Bonfield justifies the Model Act's definitions on the ground
that FAPA, "in combination with the enabling acts of the various federal agencies engaged in rate making of particular applicability, subjected that rate making . . . to most of the
adjudicatory procedures of the Federal Act."23 It took congressional action, however, apart from FAPA, to impose these adjudicatory procedures. Furthermore, because the agency action
involved was defined as rulemaking, the adjudicatory procedures were accompanied by provisions for public participation
which are absent from the adjudicatory procedures of the
Model Act. 24 Nor were the internal separation-of-function re25
quirements of FAPA made applicable to such proceedings.
But the Model Act prescribes adjudicatory procedures, including the internal separation-of-function procedures, for all
agency action of particular applicability. 26 Some other state
statute may, of course, overrule this prescription, but the general rule of FAPA is preferable.
Bonfield supports the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the the Tenth Circuit in Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus 27 that rulemaking, not adjudicatory, procedures were required when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
promulgated a rule limiting sulfur oxide emissions in Deer
Lodge County, Montana, 28 even though Anaconda was the only
source of emissions in the county and it was "inconceivable"
that any other sources would come into existence in the future.29 Almost all the reasons advanced by Bonfield to justify
22. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 78.
23. Id. at 77-78.
24. FAPA requires the notice of rulemaking, whether published in the
Federal Register or personally served on named persons "subject" to the
rulemaking, to state "the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (emphasis supplied). If the rule in question is required by the enabling statute to be made on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing, the public rulemaking proceedings must consist of hearing
and decision in accordance with 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE [FEDERAL] ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

ACT 32 (1947).
25. See AT&T v. FCC, 449 F.2d 439, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1971); 5 U.S.C.
§ 554(d).
26. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 4-214.
27. 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973).
28. See A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 82.
29. Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F. Supp. 697, 700 (D. Colo. 1972),
rev'd, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973). The Tenth Circuit's decision, reversing
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the use of rulemaking procedures in the Anaconda case would
apply to a ratemaking proceeding involving a single, named
utility in a particular locality that the Model Act requires to be
adjudicatory in nature: Anaconda was not, and the named utility would not be, "the only person or entity with important interests at stake"; 30 Anaconda's activities had, and the named
utility's activities would have,
a significant impact on the general public [and, therefore,] it is desirable to allow members of the general public an opportunity to have input into the decision-making process of the responsible agency. Rulemaking procedures provide the most reliable, inexpensive, and uncomplicated means of obtaining that input. If adjudicative procedures
were employed to issue the agency statement, members of the general
public would not necessarily have a right to present their views. And
even if the general public did have that right in such an adjudicative
proceeding, it would be more expensive and complicated to exercise. 31

If these considerations advanced by Bonfield are controlling, surely they should have been controlling even if EPA had
not adopted a general standard for acceptable emissions but had
taken action against Anaconda by name and alone. To assume
otherwise is to exalt form over substance.32
Defining a "rule" to include certain kinds of agency action
of particular applicability may not be the best way to take care
of the problem posed. It may be better to adopt the Model
Act's definition but provide for public participation in certain
kinds of adjudication. This is an example of the difficulty crethe district court, may be justified on a number of grounds. First, whether the
EPA's action was classified as rulemaking or adjudication, the action was not
required by the Clean Air Act to be taken "on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing." 482 F.2d at 1306. Second, even accepting the reality that
the EPA action would affect Anaconda alone, the EPA action may have been a
statement of "particular applicability" constituting a rule within the meaning
of FAPA. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). Finally, Anaconda did not persuade the Court
of Appeals that adjudicatory procedures were necessary to give it a fair opportunity to attack the basis of EPA's proposed order. Cf.American Airlines v.
Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.) (Board's adoption of a rule modifying the certificate of convenience of a class of carriers held valid despite
provision of Federal Aviation Act which required adjudicatory hearings before
modification or suspension of certificates of convenience), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 843 (1966).
30.

A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 82.

31. Id. At a later point in his book, Bonfield acknowledges that a refusal
to characterize an agency statement as a "rule" means that "the agency will
not be required to allow and to facilitate broad public input into [the] process
[of considering the adoption of the statement.]" Id. at 86.
32. See id. at 84 (discussing one commentator's criticism of the Anaconda
rule as an individualized action "masquerad[ing]" as a rule) (citing B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 5.8, at 218-19 (2d ed. 1984)).
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ated by making the applicability of radically different administrative procedures depend upon the classification of the agency
action as "rulemaking" or "adjudication" and not upon the nature of the particular issues involved or the individuals and
groups interested in the action. Yet we must accept Bonfield's
justification of the rule/order dichotomy 33 if we are to have an
administrative procedure act at all.
II.

THE CHOICE BETWEEN ADJUDICATION
AND RULEMAKING

Unlike FAPA, the Model Act expresses a preference for
rulemaking rather than adjudication as the means of administrative lawmaking. The Model Act requires each agency "as
soon as feasible and to the extent practicable, [to] adopt rules,
[legislative or interpretative] ... embodying appropriate standards, principles, and procedural safeguards that the agency
will apply to the law it administers. '34 Bonfield construes "to
the extent practicable" to mean "with as much precision and
detail as is capable of being accomplished successfully under
the circumstances." 35 Although Bonfield's reasons for preferring rulemaking over adjudication are persuasive, we should be
skeptical about entrusting to judges the task of invalidating
otherwise proper adjudications on the ground that, in their
opinion, the agency failed to issue a rule when it was feasible to
do so or failed to issue a rule with the "precision and detail"
that was "capable of being accomplished successfully under the
circumstances."
The Model Act recommends requiring each agency "as
soon as feasible and to the extent practicable" to "adopt rules
to supersede principles of law or policy lawfully declared by the
agency as the basis for its decisions in particular cases."'3 6 Bonfield explains that rules adopted under this provision may codify case law or may be broader or narrower than, or
prospectively overrule, case law.37 This provision, too, makes
33. See id at 68-70 (arguing that it would not have been better for the
Model Act to have prescribed that the procedure to be used should depend
upon an adjudicative facts/legislative facts differentiation, rather than on the
traditional rule/order distinction).
34. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 2-104(3), Appendix p. 590 infra.
35. See A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 127.
36. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 2-104(4), Appendix p. 590 infra. The provision is bracketed, which means that the Uniform Law Commissioners do not
regard its adoption as essential.
37. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 134.
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sense, but again we may doubt whether it should be made
mandatory so that there will be judicial review of claims that
the agency failed to comply with it. According to Bonfield, failure to comply with the provision will mean that the agency
may not subsequently rely on the line of precedent that should
have been the subject of a rule.38 "Instead, it would have to

readjudicate wholly de novo, and free of prior precedent,
whatever principles of law might apply to those circumstances." 39 Bonfield recognizes, however, that "this remedy
may not be particularly effective in practice [because] the
agency would probably readjudicate the same principle of law
embedded in the prior precedent upon which the agency could
no longer lawfully rely. '40 This same result would follow even
more surely if a court decided that an agency had not adopted
an interpretative rule "as soon as feasible and to the extent
practicable." Why then make these requirements mandatory
and subject to judicial review?
III. RULEMAKING PROCEDURES
A.

ONE SET OF RULEMAKING PROCEDURES

FAPA sharply differentiates between the procedures prescribed for informal (notice-and-comment) rulemaking 41 and
those prescribed for formal (on-the-record) rulemaking.42 The
Model Act provides for only one set of procedures for rulemaking that resembles FAPA's informal procedures.
B. ADVICE ON POSSIBLE RULES BEFORE NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULE ADOPTION

Unlike FAPA, the Model Act expressly authorizes agencies
to solicit comments, and to appoint committees to comment, on
subject matters of possible rulemaking under active consideration within the agency. 43 Federal agencies were expected to,
and do, engage in these practices, which are permitted by
FAPA. But one justification advanced by Bonfield for such
consultation may be dubious; namely, that agencies are committed to the rules they propose for adoption and therefore should
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41.
42.
43.

5 U.S.C. § 553.
Id- §§ 554, 556, 557.
MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-101, Appendix pp. 590-91 infra.
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consult affected interests even prior to proposing rules.4 4 I
know of no study that has tested this hypothesis.

C. NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE ADOPTION
Unlike FAPA, the Model Act requires the notice of the
proposed rule to include the text of the proposed rule unless
the conditions of a narrowly drawn exception are satisfied, 45 an
exception that assumes the agency will have a text of a proposed rule in every case. Bonfield thinks this requirement is
sound because it will resolve doubts about the adequacy of the
contents of a notice of proposed rulemaking and deter the
agency from adopting a rule substantially different from the
one proposed. 46 But if agency commitment to a proposed rule
is undesirable because it negates the purpose of public participation in its formulation, the requirement is undesirable since
the agency is more likely to be committed to a proposed rule
the text of which has been the subject of coiisultation with interested groups than to a proposed rule the precise contents of
which have not yet been formulated.

D. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The Model Act requires the agency to schedule an oral proceeding on a proposed rule if a written request therefor is submitted by a political subdivision, another agency, or a specified
minimum number of persons.47 Federal agencies may conduct
oral proceedings on proposed rules but are not compelled to do
so by any provision of FAPA governing informal or even onthe-record rulemaking. 48 The Model Act does not, however,
call for a trial-type oral proceeding. 49 Bonfield suggests "it
might have been desirable to add an explicit provision... au44. See A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 157-58.
45. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, §§ 3-103(a), Appendix p. 592 infra, 2-101(e),
Appendix p. 589 infra.
46. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 177.
47. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-104(b), Appendix pp. 592-93 infra. The
minimum number suggested is 25. It is also suggested that the administrative
rules review committee (described in § 3-203, Appendix pp. 601-02 infra) and
the administrative rules counsel (described in § 3-202, Appendix p. 601 infra)
be authorized to request an oral proceeding.
48. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) authorizes each agency to "adopt procedures for the
submission of all or part of the evidence in written form" if no party will "be
prejudiced thereby."
49. The nature of the oral proceeding is left to each agency to determine
by rule. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-104(b), Appendix pp. 592-93 infra.
Even in the case of federal on-the-record rulemaking, FAPA permits the

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:543

thorizing persons to petition for additional procedures (e.g.,
cross-examination) in rule making based on a claim that those
procedures would, in the particular circumstances, be a useful
and efficient way of resolving important disputed factual issues" but he thinks such additional procedures "are impliedly
available" under the Model Act as written.50 Even in connection with federal informal rulemaking, some statutes5 ' and judicial decisions 5 2 are creating rights to cross-examination when
necessary to determine the legislative facts underlying the rule.

E.

THE REGULATORY ANALYSIS

The Model Act requires each agency to issue a regulatory
analysis of each proposed rule if requested to do so by politically responsible state officials, a political subdivision, another
agency, or a specified minimum number of persons. 53 The regulatory analysis must contain an analysis of the costs and benefits of the proposed rule quantified "to the extent practicable"
and take into account "both short-term and long-term consequences. '5 4 If the agency makes a "good faith" effort to produce the required regulatory analysis, the rule "may not be
invalidated on the ground that the contents of the regulatory
analysis are insufficient or inaccurate. ' 55 Although FAPA does
not call for a regulatory analysis, the President has required executive agencies to prepare such analyses and have them re56
viewed by the Office of Management and Budget.
Bonfield carefully weighs the merits of the Model Act's requirements.57 The justifications he advances for them are
sound. One may agree that cost-benefit analyses will not produce principled, objective, and reliable answers to every specific
agency to allow only "such cross-examination as may be required for a full and

true disclosure of the facts." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
50. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 200-01.
51. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, § 11,
15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (1982).
52. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631,
649 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Long Island R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490, 499
(E.D.N.Y. 1970).

53. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-105, Appendix pp. 593-94 infra. Three
hundred is suggested as the minimum number of persons that should be entitled to call for a regulatory analysis. Id.
54. Id. § 3-105(c), Appendix p. 594 infra.
55. Id. § 3-105(f), Appendix p. 594 infra.
56. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601
note at 431-34 (1982). See also Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 92-93 (Supp. III 1985).
57.

A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 207-12.
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issue of regulation. Nevertheless, agencies should be made to
utilize, in the most reasonable fashion, the best information
bearing upon their problems that is available or can be
obtained.
Bonfield does not discuss the timing of the regulatory analysis requirement. To mandate that the regulatory analysis accompany the proposed rule will tend to commit the agency to
the proposed rule. If the agency responds to the comments on
its proposal, it may have to alter its regulatory analysis. To encourage agency receptiveness to public criticism of its proposal
and lessen the burden on the agency, it may be preferable to
require the agency to accompany its adopted, but not its proposed, rule with a regulatory analysis. In publishing its proposed rule, the agency should be required to specify that it
desires to have comments on the costs and benefits of the
proposal.
Bonfield thinks it is unwise for private persons to be permitted to request a regulatory analysis because they may do so
"only to delay or harass agencies. 5 8s Because a regulatory analysis will contribute greatly to the evaluation of the rationality
of a rule, it should not be required only when demanded by
elected officials with general responsibility for state government. It would be preferable to require a regulatory analysis of
all important rules. 59 Because it is difficult to formulate criteria of importance, a request for an analysis by a significant
number of private persons may be a satisfactory surrogate for
such criteria. Even so, it would be desirable to exempt from
the regulatory analysis requirement those rules that codify
"principles of law or policy lawfully declared by the agency as
'60
These princithe basis for its decisions in particular cases."
ples have been justified in the decided cases; to require a regu58. 1d at 215.
59. Executive Order No. 12,291, for example, requires a regulatory analysis only in connection with a "major rule," defined as any rule that is likely to

result in
(1) [ain annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more;
(2) [a] major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or geographic
regions; or
(3) [s]ignificant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United Statesbased enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domes-

tic or export markets.
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at
431-34 (1982).
60. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 2-104(4), Appendix p. 590 infra.
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latory analysis for such codification rules may discourage
agencies from adopting them.
Bonfield explains that the regulatory analysis may be considered by a court reviewing a challenge to the validity of a particular rule on the ground that it is arbitrary and capricious. 61
But he doubts the wisdom of the Model Act's provision that a
rule may be invalidated because the agency failed to make a
good faith effort to comply with the specifications regarding the
contents of the analysis. 62 Inevitably, the claim of agency failure to act in good faith will be made most strongly in cases in
which the claim of arbitrary and capricious agency action is
weakest. To avoid the mischief inherent in this provision, Bonfield suggests that the courts hold that an agency has acted in
"good faith" if the analysis "on its face ...actually addresses
in
some manner all of the points specified" in the Model Act regarding its contents. 63 Reviewing courts, however, may not accept Bonfield's view that such agency performance amounts to
a "good faith" effort in every case. It would be better for states
to adopt the language of an earlier draft of the Model Act that
the adequacy of the contents of the regulatory analysis is not
subject to judicial review.6 4
F.

AGENCY CONSIDERATION OF COMMENTS

ON PROPOSED RULE

The Model Act requires the agency to "consider the written submissions, oral submissions or any memorandum summarizing oral submissions [prepared by agency staff], and any
regulatory analysis. ' 65 FAPA provides simply that "[a]fter consideration of the relevant matter presented" by interested persons, the agency will or will not adopt a rule.66 The more
explicit command of the Model Act, Bonfield concludes, may
convince courts that they should subject agency heads in some
situations to examination in court "as to the extent to which
they in fact had the requisite understanding of all the submissions and presentations in a particular rule making." 67 One
such situation would be present if the parties challenging the
rule showed by extrinsic evidence ("all evidence other than the
61.

A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 223.

62. Id.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 221 (quoting MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-105 comment).
See id. at 223-24.
MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-106(c), Appendix pp. 594-95 infra.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 228.
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legally compelled testimony of the agency heads themselves,
[such as] voluntary admissions, testimony of other persons, and
all circumstantial evidence" 68 ) that "the agency head issuing a
rule did not personally read the written submissions or person'6 9
The reviewing court
ally preside at the oral presentations.
satisfied with the
not
it
was
could then invalidate the rule if
the written subof
contents
agency head's understanding of the
70
presentations.
oral
and
missions
Bonfield thus envisages that agency heads could be examined in court even if they carefully studied memoranda prepared by agency staff summarizing written and oral
submissions by interested persons but did not personally preside at oral presentations or personally read all the written submissions. Bonfield thinks heads of state agencies personally
preside and read submissions much more frequently than heads
of federal agencies.71 This may be the case, but I doubt they do
so very often and I know of no study of actual practice in this
regard. Even if agency heads do so frequently, they should not
be subject to examination in court in the particular cases in
which they did not follow this practice.
Certainly the Model Act provision in question no more
mandates such examination than the comparable FAPA provision mandated the dubious result in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.72 In that case, the Secretary of
Transportation's failure to issuefindings impelled the Supreme
Court to hold that he could be subjected to interrogation about
the reasons for his action. 73 Overton Park, therefore, is not
precedent for Bonfield's conclusion.
74
Bonfield thinks that Morgan IV, which held that the reviewing court should not probe the mental processes of the administrator, 75 may apply only when the agency is engaged in
adjudication, not rulemaking. 7 6 But rulemaking is an a fortiori
case for applying Morgan IV because the burden of personally
reading all the written submissions and personally presiding at
the oral presentations is greater in rulemaking than in adjudi68. I.
69. Id
70.
71.

I&
See id at 229.

72.

401 U.S. 402 (1971).

73. Id. at 420.
74.

United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).

75.

Id. at 422.

76.

See A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 227-28.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:543

cation.77 Justice Frankfurter's admonition to the courts in Morgan IV about inquiring into the administrative decision-making
process is as applicable to rulemaking as it is to adjudication:
"[A]lthough the administrative process has had a different development and pursues somewhat different ways from those of
courts, they are to be deemed collaborative instrumentalities of
justice and the appropriate independence of each should be
'7 8
respected by the other.

G. TIME FOR ADOPTION OF RULE
Unlike FAPA, the Model Act requires the agency to terminate the rulemaking proceeding if it does not adopt a rule
within a specified period of time (180 days is suggested) after
publication of the notice of the proposed rule or the end of the
oral proceedings thereon, whichever is later. 79 Bonfield justifies this provision as contributing to the political function of
rulemaking procedures by ensuring that agencies will take final
action on proposed rules "while the attention of the public is
still focused upon them"8 0 and not delay final action "until the
public furor over [them] has died down and the public has forgotten the proposal is still pending."8 1 Bonfield reports that
there "have been occasions" when agencies have acted in this
2
fashion.

H. VARIANCE BETWEEN ADOPTED RULE AND PROPOSED RULE
Unlike FAPA, the Model Act expressly provides that an
agency may not adopt a rule that is "substantially different"
from the proposed rule.8 3 If the agency does adopt a substantially different rule, the reviewing court may invalidate it. 8 4
The court may find a substantial difference on the basis of any
one of the following factors, which are not intended to be
exclusive:
(1)

the extent to which all persons affected by the adopted rule

77. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 491 F.2d 1141, 1145-46
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974).
78. 313 U.S. at 422 (citing United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 191
(1939)).
79. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 3-106(b), Appendix p. 594 infra.
80.

A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 231.

81.
82.

Id. at 230-31.
Id at 231-32.

83.
84.

MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-107(a), Appendix p. 595 infra.

Id. § 5-116(c)(5), Appendix pp. 609-10 infra.
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should have understood that the published proposed rule would affect
their interests;
(2) the extent to which the subject matter of the adopted rule or

the issues determined by that rule are different from the subject matter or issues involved in the published proposed rule; and
(3)

the extent to which the effects of the adopted rule differ

from the
effects of the published proposed rule had it been adopted
85

instead.

Although I agree with Bonfield that meaningful public participation requires "some limits" on the variance between the
adopted rule and the proposed rule, 6 I doubt that the Model
Act has imposed satisfactory limits. I would not object if the
first specified factor to be considered in determining substantial
difference were the exclusive test. Adding the other two factors and authorizing courts to consider additional factors as
well will discourage agencies from changing proposed rules in
response to public submissions for fear of provoking litigation
or successive rounds of rulemaking proceedings. The possibility
of variance is enhanced by Bonfield's view that the Model Act
requires agencies to formulate the notice and text of a proposed
rule so as to give "fair notice of the precise contents of the
rule" that might be adopted.8 7 It should be sufficient if the
agency gives the public adequate notice of the general scope of
the proposed rulemaking proceeding and of the interests that
may be affected thereby.
The only example Bonfield gives of a substantial difference
on the basis of factor (2) or (3) is of a utility commission that
publishes the text of a proposed rule limiting annual rate increases by electric utilities to three percent but adopts a final
rule allowing annual increases of six percent.8 8 Bonfield agrees
that the "class of persons affected by the adopted rule probably
would have understood that the published proposed rule implicated their interests [and that] the subject matter of the
adopted rule-a fixed rate increase-was identical to the subject matter of the proposed rule, and the issues involved would
probably also have been deemed to be similar."8 9 Nevertheless,
Bonfield would find a substantial variance because "the impact
of the adopted rule would be 100 percent greater than the im85.

i

§ 3-107(b), Appendix p. 595 infra; A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at

235-36.
86. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 232.

87. Id at 237.
88. Id. at 238, 240.
89. Id at 240.
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pact of the published proposed rule." 90
But why should that difference in impact be sufficient to
invalidate the rule? Certainly the interests opposed to the electric utilities reasonably could be expected to understand that
the utilities would strive for a rate higher than three percent
and that they had better be prepared to support a rate no
higher than three percent. In what way can they reasonably
claim to have been prejudiced by the variance between the proposed and the adopted rule? If the record showed that the antiutility interests presented data and argued against a six percent
increase, would they be held to have been "substantially
prejudiced" 9 ' because of the variance within the meaning of the
applicable scope of review provision of the Model Act?
I.

ExEMPTIoNS FROM PUBLIC RULEMAKING PROCEDURES

1.

General Exemption

Like FAPA, the Model Act makes the basic rulemaking
procedures inapplicable whenever the agency for "good cause"
finds that they are "unnecessary, impracticable, or contrary to
the public interest in the process of adopting a particular
rule." 92 But unlike FAPA, the Model Act imposes the burden
on the agency, in any action to invalidate a rule exempted for
"good cause," to persuade the reviewing court that the exemp93
tion was justified.
Unlike FAPA, the Model Act authorizes the administrative
rules review committee of the legislature, 94 or the governor, 95
within two years after the effective date of a rule exempted for
good cause, to require the agency to conduct a proceeding on
the rule that will afford the procedures from which the rule
was exempted. 96 Once such a request is filed, the rule becomes
90. Id,
91. See MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 5-116(c)(5), Appendix pp. 609-10 infra.
92. Id. § 3-108(a), Appendix p. 595 infra. Such rules are exempt from
§§ 3-103 (notice of proposed rule adoption), 3-104 (public participation), 3-105
(regulatory analysis), 3-106 (time and manner of rule adoption) and 3-107 (variance between published and adopted rule). They remain subject to §§ 3-101
(advice on possible rules), 3-102 (public rulemaking docket), 3-110 (concise explanatory statement), 3-111 (contents, style and form of rule), 3-112 (agency
rulemaking record), 3-114 (filing of rules), 3-115 (effective date of rules) and 3117 (petition for adoption of a rule or the amendment, repeal or suspension of
an existing rule).
93. Id. § 3-108(b), Appendix p. 595 infra.
94. Id. §§ 3-203, 3-204, Appendix pp. 601-03 infra.
95. Id. § 3-202, Appendix p. 601 infra.
96. Id. § 3-108(c), Appendix pp. 595-96 infra.
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a temporary rule; that is, it ceases to become effective 180 days
thereafter, unless reissued in original or modified form after
97
the public rulemaking proceeding runs its course.
I doubt the wisdom of this provision. Once a rule has gone
into effect, the legislative committee and the governor, like any
other person, should be required to file a petition to amend, repeal, or suspend it. 93 This would require the petitionerto state
what is undesirable about the rule and assist the agency in its
further consideration of the rule. A governor who is very dissatisfied with an existing rule is empowered by the Model Act
to rescind or suspend it. 99
2.

Interpretative Rules

Like FAPA, the Model Act also exempts interpretative
rules but, unlike FAPA, it provides that a reviewing court
should then determine their validity de novo, L° ° that is, "without any deference to the agency's view of the matter."'u L This
is a troublesome provision. The merit of an agency interpretation of a statute should stand on its own feet. The reviewing
court's judgment of its merit should not depend on whether it
is embodied in an ad hoc adjudication, legislative rule, interpretative rule preceded by public rulemaking procedures, or exempt interpretative rule. It should depend on the nature of the
issue raised by those objecting to the interpretation and the respective competencies of agency and court to determine that issue. The general rule stated by Bonfield that "a court may
properly substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
propriety of an interpretative rule, but not with respect to the
propriety of a legislative rule"'0 2 does not always reflect the realities of the review process. 03
As a practical matter, furthermore, it would be extremely
97. I&
98. See id §§ 3-117, Appendix p. 600 infra, 1-102(10), Appendix p. 588
infra.
99. Id § 3-202(a), Appendix p. 601 infra.
100. Id § 3-109, Appendix p. 596 infra. Interpretative rules are exempt
from all the procedures from which rules may be exempt for good cause and
are subject to all the procedures to which the latter are subject. See supra
note 92. But the agency need not find "good cause" for their exemption.
101. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 298.
102. Id at 286-87.
103. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Addison v.
Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 611-16 (1944); H. HART & A. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF

LAW 1345-47 (Tent. ed. 1958).
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difficult for a court to heed the mandate of the Model Act to
review exempt interpretative rules without any deference to
the agency's view of the matter. The interpretative rule would
still be before the reviewing court and would have an effect
upon the court even
if it stated that it engaged in the mandated
10 4
de novo review.
3.

Other Exemptions
Finally, the Model Act exempts from practically all the
rulemaking procedures certain specified classes of rules. L 5 I
have commented elsewhere on most of these exemptions,
which are modeled upon the Iowa Administrative Procedure
Act, 0 6 and Bonfield responds to my comments. 10 7 Bonfield recommends generally that states should add a provision to the
Model Act that "[t]o the extent that it is practicable an agency
shall, before adopting a rule [falling into one of these exempt
classes], give advance notice in some suitable manner of the
contents of the contemplated rule to persons who would be affected by it, and solicit their views thereon."'' 08 This would
soften the objections I voiced against some of the exemptions.
J.

CONCISE STATEMENT EXPLAINING THE RULE

FAPA requires the agency simply to "incorporate in the
rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose."'' 0 9 The Model Act's requirement is not much more
specific. It states that the concise explanatory statement accompanying the rule must contain the agency's "reasons for
adopting the rule" and "an indication of any change between
the text of the proposed rule... and the text of the rule as fi104. For the same reason, I would question whether an interpretative rule
should be subject to § 3-115, which provides that no rule shall become "effective" until thirty days after "its filing in the office of the [secretary of state or]

its publication and indexing in the [administrative bulletin]," whichever is
later. See MODEL ACT,supra note 4, § 3-115(a), Appendix p. 598 infra.
105. These classes of rules are exempt from all rulemaking procedures except MODEL ACT, supra note 4, §§ 3-101, Appendix pp. 590-91 infra, (advice as
to possible rules), and 3-117, Appendix p. 600 infra, (petition for adoption of a
rule or the amendment, repeal or suspension of an existing rule) under § 3116, Appendix pp. 599-600 infra.
106. See Auerbach, Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota, 63 MINN. L.
REV. 151, 238-51 (1979).

107. See A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 396-421. The only classes of exempt
rules not commented upon are those set forth in § 3-116(7), (8), (10), Appendix
pp. 599-600 infra, which obviously warrant exemption.
108.

A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 421.

109.

5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
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nally adopted, with the reasons for any change."11 0 But, unlike
FAPA, the Model Act goes on to say that "[o]nly the [factual,
legal and policy] reasons contained in the concise explanatory
statement may be used by any party [including the agency] as
justifications for the adoption of the rule in any proceeding in
which its validity is at issue."'1 1 Bonfield disagrees with the decision of the Uniform Law Commissioners to delete from an
earlier draft of the Model Act the requirement that the concise
explanatory statement also contain "all 'the arguments for and
against the rule considered by the agency' as well as '[the
agency's] reasons for rejecting the arguments against adoption
of the rule.' "112 Despite this deletion, Bonfield thinks the
agency is still obliged "to respond briefly in the required explanatory statement to the principal issues raised in the public
submissions and rule-making record." 1 13
What Bonfield wishes to add to the concise explanatory
statement is essentially what FAPA requires with respect to
formal, on-the-record rulemaking, that is, "findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record."'' 14
Some federal statutes contain similar requirements for informal rules issued thereunder. Even apart from such statutory
provisions, the developing federal concept of an exclusive administrative informal rulemaking record for purposes of judicial review has led federal courts to interpret the requirement
of a "concise general statement" of the "basis and purpose" of
an "informal" rule so as to accomplish the essential objectives
of the "findings and conclusions" requirement in connection
with a "formal" rule." 5 I shall discuss below"x 6 the merits of
Bonfield's suggestion, and of the Model Act's provision, that
only the factual, legal and policy reasons contained in the explanatory statement may be used to justify the rule in any proceeding in which the validity of the rule is challenged.
Bonfield also would have liked the Model Act to contain a
requirement that a concise explanatory statement accompany
110. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 3-110(a), Appendix p. 596 infra.
111. Id.; A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 316-17.
112. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 310.
113. Id. at 312-13.
114. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A).
115. See Auerbach, Informal Rule Making: A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative Proceduresand JudicialReview, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 15,
56-58 (1977).
116. See infra text accompanying notes 238-46.
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an agency's decision to abandon a proposed rule.11 7 Because
agency inaction may affect the public interest as seriously as
agency action, such a requirement would be valuable.
K.

PETITIONS FOR THE ADOPTION, AMENDMENT, REPEAL OR
SUSPENSION OF A RULE

The Model Act, like FAPA, gives any person the right to
petition an agency for the adoption, amendment, repeal or suspension of a rule, including an interpretative rule.118 Within a
stated period of time, the agency must either "deny the petition
in writing, stating its reasons therefor. ... initiate rule-making
proceedings in accordance with [the Model Act,] or... if otherwise lawful, adopt a rule."1 i 9 Failure of the agency to conform
to these requirements would constitute "agency action" subject
to judicial review.
The Model Act, explains Bonfield, "in no way limits the
agency's discretion in deciding whether the law should continue
as it is or should be changed.' 20 The reviewing court may,
however, determine whether "any of the agency's proffered
reasons for failing to act are facially inadequate, unreasonable,
or otherwise improper. 1 2 ' If the court finds the agency action
to be improper, all it may do, except in "the most rare and
egregious situations," is order the agency to reconsider. 22 To
illustrate an egregious situation, Bonfield gives the case "where
the agency states that it would have adopted the rule requested
' 23
but for a particular reason that is clearly unconstitutional.'
While I recognize that an agency's failure to act may be as
harmful to the public interest as its positive action, I doubt the
wisdom of subjecting its inaction to judicial review. The possibility of such review will encourage interest groups to try to
impose their own priorities upon agencies that are always
struggling with problems of allocating limited resources. The
limited grounds upon which Bonfield envisages judicial review
would proceed are not sufficiently protective of the agency's allocative decisions. In determining whether the agency's proffered reasons for inaction are reasonable, the reviewing court
117. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 313-14.
118. Compare MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-117, Appendix p. 600 infra
with 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
119. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-117.
120. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 431.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 432.
123. Id.

1987]

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING

563

will not be in a position to see the whole picture as the agency
sees it. The reviewing court will concentrate on the matter
before it. It may be said, in response, that it is up to the agency
to present the whole picture to the reviewing court in justification of its particular failure to act. Does such litigation serve
the public interest?
Even if judicial review makes sense with respect to the denial of petitions for the adoption of legislative rules, it does not
make sense with respect to denials of petitions for the adoption
of interpretative rules. Considering the function interpretative
rules perform, their issuance should be left entirely to the
agency's discretion.
IV.

AGENCY REVIEW OF RULES

The Model Act contains an innovative provision to assure
24
that agencies periodically evaluate and reconsider their rules.It "is intended," Bonfield explains, "as a practical substitute for
the more drastic sunset proposals for agency rules."' 2 5 At least
once every seven years, the agency must perform an in-depth
analysis of each rule to determine the rule's effectiveness in
achieving its objectives. The agency is required to make public
a "concise statement" setting forth its analysis and include "a
summary of any available data supporting the conclusions
reached.' 26 With respect to some rules, Bonfield writes, "this
will undoubtedly require the accumulation of empirical data by
agencies that is not yet in existence but that is accessible to the
1 27
agencies at a reasonable cost.
V.

GUBERNATORIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES

To implement the political model of rulemaking, the Model
Act, unlike FAPA, gives the governor complete authority over
every agency's rules. The governor is empowered "[t]o the extent the agency itself would have authority ... [to] rescind or
suspend all or a severable portion of" any rule by executive order.128 The governor also may "summarily terminate any pending rulemaking proceeding by an executive order to that effect,
stating therein the reasons for the action.' 1 29 An administra124. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 3-201, Appendix pp. 600-01 infra.
125. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 436.
126. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-201(1), Appendix pp. 600-01 infra.
127. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 438.
128. MODEL Ac, supra note 4, § 3-202(a), Appendix p. 601 infra.
129. Id. § 3-202(b), Appendix p. 601 infra.
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tive rules counsel is created within the office of the governor,
appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor, to advise the governor in exercising this authority over agency
130
rules.
The Model Act gives the governor greater power over
agency rules than the President has sought to exercise over federal executive agency rules. 13 ' Although the Model Act, unlike
Executive Order 12,498, does not expressly empower the executive to require agencies to submit to the executive annual statements of their "regulatory policies, goals, and objectives for the
coming year and information concerning all significant regulatory actions underway or planned,"'1 32 this authority may be implied as necessary and proper for the exercise of the governor's
authority to "summarily terminate any pending rulemaking
proceeding."
Executive Order 12,498 requires the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) to "consider the consistency
of the draft regulatory program [of each agency] with the Administration's policies and priorities and the draft regulatory
programs submitted by other agencies [and to] identify such
further regulatory or deregulatory actions as may, in his view,
be necessary in order to achieve such consistency."'1 33 Although
the Model Act would permit the governor to authorize the administrative rules counsel to perform a similar function, it does
not authorize the governor to order an agency to institute a
proceeding for the adoption of a new rule. Because the governor may rescind or suspend a rule for any reason, however, an
agency would undoubtedly honor a suggestion from the governor that it institute a proceeding to amend, repeal or suspend
an existing rule. Because the failure of an agency to act may be
contrary to the public interest as viewed by the governor, there
is no reason why the Model Act, going as far as it does, should
not also authorize the governor to order a proceeding for the
adoption of a new rule. Bonfield does not discuss this
34
possibility.
Bonfield presents the arguments against gubernatorial re130. Id. § 3-202(c), Appendix p. 601 infra.
131. See executive orders cited supra note 56.
132. Exec. Order No. 12,498 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 note at 92 (Supp. III 1985).
133. Id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 93
(Supp. III 1985).
134. Bonfield does point out that the Model Act "does not vest the governor with any affirmative authority to adopt a rule on behalf of an agency." A.
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view of agency rules, 35 but concludes that it is necessary to coordinate state policy and assure rulemaking that is acceptable
to the body politic.' 36 Although I agree with this conclusion, I
"summaam troubled by the grant of power to the governor to
' 37
rily terminate any pending rule-making proceeding."'
The practice of presidential (OMB) review of federal exec38
utive agency rulemaking is heatedly criticized and defended.'
A good deal of the criticism is directed at the secrecy of the review process. This criticism cannot be leveled at the Model Act
insofar as it authorizes the governor to rescind or suspend
agency rules because the governor may do so only after follow39
ing the public rulemaking procedures prescribed by the Act.
This criticism can be leveled at the Model Act insofar as it authorizes the governor to summarily terminate any pending
rulemaking proceeding because the governor may do so without
following the public rulemaking procedures. 40
Bonfield justifies this distinction on the ground that because the agency may summarily terminate a pending rulemaking proceeding,' 4 ' the governor should be able to do so.'4 But
there is an important difference between the consequences of
an agency and gubernatorial summary termination. Affected
parties may secure judicial review of the agency's failure to act
but probably not of the governor's summary termination. Bonfield does not think there would be judicial review of gubernatorial action suspending or rescinding a rule except on
procedural grounds and even then review "would probably be
ineffective in most cases.' 4 3 He does not read the limitation in
BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 465. This, however, is not the suggestion I am

making.
135. Id. at 460-63, 478-81.
136. Id. at 478-79.
137. See MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 3-202(b), Appendix p. 601 infra.
138. See, e.g., Demuth & Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986) (defending); Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99
HARv. L. REv. 1059 (1986) (criticizing); Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the
President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986)
(defending); Note, PresidentialPolicy Management of Agency Rules Under
Reagan Order 12, 498, at 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 63 (1986) (criticizing). See also
Symposium on PresidentialControl of Administrative Rulemaking, 56 TUL.

L. REV.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

811 (1982).
See MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 3-202(a), Appendix p. 601 infra.
See id. § 3-202(c), Appendix p. 601 infra.
Id. § 3-106(b), Appendix p. 594 infra.
A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 470.
Id. at 480.
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the Model Act that the governor may rescind or suspend a rule
only "[t]o the extent the agency itself would have authority" to
14 4
do so

as requiring the governor to employ the standards the

agency would have to use in taking such action. 145 He explains
that the limitation is intended to apply when a rule has been
issued pursuant to a statutory mandate that vests no discretion
in the agency as to its precise terms or content. 46 Because the
agency would then have no authority to rescind or suspend the
rule, the governor, too, would have no such authority. 147 If
there will be no judicial review of gubernatorial action to rescind or suspend a rule, clearly there also will be no judicial review of gubernatorial action to terminate a rulemaking
proceeding summarily.
The most troublesome aspect of a gubernatorial power to
terminate a rulemaking proceeding summarily is not the absence of judicial review. It is the fact that such termination
may prevent the most informed exercise of the executive's
political function. It is a mistake to think of the rationality and
political models of rulemaking in separate, unrelated compartments. Greater knowledge about the factual and policy justifications for a proposed rule, which can be developed by the
agency in a rulemaking proceeding, may cause the executive to
change its mind about what is desirable as a matter of policy
and acceptable to the body politic. With this consideration in
mind, a forceful argument can be made against giving the executive power to terminate a rulemaking proceeding summarily
and for requiring the executive to await the outcome of the proceeding and see how the agency has accommodated the "rational" and "political" considerations in the particular instance.
Indeed, Bonfield's justification of this gubernatorial power ignores the wise view he expresses in the introduction to the
book that the "political model" may "successfully be accommodated with [the "comprehensive rationality" model only] by assuming dominance in the [agency law making] process only
after the ["comprehensive rationality" model] has largely run
its course."'' -4
Yet because of the hazards of a general rule one way or the
other, the Model Act should not prohibit the governor from
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-202(a), Appendix p. 601 infra.
See A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 480.
See id at 467-68.
Id.
Id. at 9-10.
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ever terminating a rulemaking proceeding summarily. In some
instances, the executive may be certain that any rule the
agency may adopt following a pending proceeding will be inconsistent with its policy and have to be superseded. The governor
should then be able to terminate the proceeding summarily.
One can only urge governors armed with this power to use it
149
sparingly.
VI.

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES

Unlike FAPA, the Model Act creates a bipartisan committee of both houses of the state legislature to review agency
rules. 50 The administrative rules review committee is required
to "selectively review possible, proposed, or adopted rules."' 51
It is given no veto power but may "recommend that a particular
rule be superseded in whole or in part by statute."' 5 2 In addition, the committee may file in the office of the secretary of
state an objection to all or a portion of a rule on the ground
that it is "beyond the procedural or substantive authority delegated to the adopting agency."'1 53 It must state concisely the
reasons for its objection.'5 Within a specific number of days,
the agency issuing the rule must respond in writing to the committee. 5 5 If the committee does not then withdraw or modify
its objection, "the burden is upon the agency in any proceeding
for judicial review or for enforcement of the rule to establish
that the whole or portion of the rule objected to is within the
procedural and substantive authority delegated to the
agency."' 5 6 The committee, unlike the governor, is given express authority to recommend that the agency adopt a new rule
and to require the agency to publish notice of the committee's
149. As a practical matter, prohibiting the governor from terminating a
rulemaking proceeding summarily is not likely to achieve its objective as long
as the governor retains the power to rescind rules. Because of this power, as
Bonfield appreciates, the governor's administrative rules counsel "is likely to
be actively and continuously involved on a consultative basis in the rule making of the various state agencies." Id. at 471. A strong intimation from the
counsel that the governor will rescind any rule that may eventuate from a particular rulemaking proceeding will undoubtedly lead the agency, on its own, to
terminate the proceeding.
150. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-203, Appendix pp. 601-02 infra.
151. Id § 3-204(a), Appendix p. 602 infra.
152. Id. § 3-204(c), Appendix p. 602 infra.
153. I1& § 3-204(d)(1), Appendix pp. 602-03 infra.
154. Id155. Id. § 3-204(d)(4), Appendix pp. 602-03 infra.
156. Id- § 3-204(d)(5), Appendix pp. 602-03 infra.
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recommendation as a proposed rule of the agency and allow
15 7
public participation on it.
These provisions for legislative review of agency rules must
be evaluated in light of the Model Act's rejection of a possible
alternative-the legislative veto-as undesirable 158 and probably unconstitutional under most state constitutions. 159 Nevertheless, these provisions are unwise. On its face, the power
given to the administrative rules committee to object to a rule
does not implement the political model of rulemaking because
the committee may not object on the policy ground that the
rule is "unsound or undesirable," but only on the ground that it
is ultra vires, that is, "beyond the procedural or substantive authority delegated to the adopting agency. 1 60 Bonfield adds,
however, that the committee may object that the rule is ultra
vires if it "is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt"1 61 that the
rule "is so unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious as to be
1 62
unauthorized."
I agree with Bonfield that the committee should not be
given authority to object to an agency rule on policy grounds.
That "would divest the agencies of the very discretion that they
were authorized to exercise by statute .... deny the public the
benefit of the agencies' expertise on policy matters within their
lawful authority, 1 63 and allow the committee to undercut the
legislature as a whole that authorized the rule in question. 164 I
would add only that such authority would also give undue
weight to the interest groups that could afford to maintain continuous contacts with the committee and its staff.
Yet Bonfield recognizes that, in practice, the line drawn by
the Model Act will be thin indeed because "a committee might
be inclined to substitute its judgment as to the desirability of a
rule for that of the agency, and then cloak that judgment in the
mantle of the statutory terms." 165 Nevertheless, Bonfield concludes that although "this potential danger is significant and
troublesome, it appears to be outweighed by the potential bene,157. Id § 3-204(e), Appendix p. 603 infra.
158. See A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 507-14.
159. See id. at 497-507; Frickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative Committee Suspension of Administrative Rules: The Case of Minnesota, 70 MINN.
L. REV. 1237 (1986).
160. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 519.
161. Id. at 520.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 521.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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fits of this legislative device to check illegal agency rule
166
making."
This conclusion underestimates the likely dynamics of the
167
committee review process, which Bonfield well understands.
The combination of the committee's restricted power to object
to an adopted rule with its unrestricted power to require the
agency to institute a public proceeding on its recommendation
to repeal, amend or suspend an existing rule or adopt a new
rule, and to make its views known on possible and proposed
rules will cause the agency to heed the committee's wishes in
most cases. At the very least, the review process will encourage
negotiation between committee and agency staffs that may produce compromises the agency would not otherwise have acwith the governor's
negotiations
cepted. Concurrent
administrative rules counsel may reinforce the legislative committee's position and add to the pressures on the agency or produce deadlocks.
These dynamics are more important than shifting the burden to the agency to establish the validity of a challenged rule
whenever the agency has refused to heed the committee's objection. The shifting of the burden may not, itself, have an in
terrorem effect upon the agency, 168 but the consequences of the
shifting will have to be considered by the agency along with all
the political implications of the legislative review process.
Although Bonfield views these implications as implementing
effectively the political model of rulemaking, 169 their consequences may be even more undesirable than the legislative
veto. The veto at least fixes responsibility on the legislative
166. Id.
167. See id. at 548-49.
168. Bonfield envisages a two-step process of judicial review of an agency
rule to which the committee has objected. The court will first review the validity of the objection. In determining its validity, "[t]he question is not
whether the committee is correct in its assessment that the rule ... is illegal
[,but] whether a reasonable committee could believe the rule to be illegal." Id.

at 532. If so, the committee objection is proper and the burden of persuading
the court that the rule is valid shifts to the agency. If not, the committee objection is improper and the burden of persuading the court that the rule is invalid remains with the challengers. Id No matter who has the burden, "the
court may determine de novo the legality of the rule." Id. at 533. But if the
committee objects to a rule, "in borderline or unclear cases, the court is likely
to find the rule in question to be unlawful." Id One may question the ability
of any reviewing court to make these distinctions and this doubt may add to
the in terrorem effect of shifting the burden.

169.

See id at 549.
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body exercising it. The committee review process may operate
effectively behind the scenes.
Finally, to give the administrative rules committee of the
legislature power to check illegal agency rulemaking is to give
it authority traditionally exercised by the courts, which it is not
nearly as competent as the courts to exercise. Furthermore, despite the Model Act's provision that the failure of the committee to object to a rule is not an implied legislative authorization
of the rule, 17 0 the likelihood is that reviewing courts will not
scrutinize an ultra vires challenge as carefully when there is no
committee objection to a rule as when there is an objection.
There will be even less of a judicial "hard look" if the committee failed to object to a rule after instituting a public proceeding
to assist it in its review. Persons affected by agency rules may
come to rue this consequence of the legislative review process
and have added reason to maximize the political pressures on
the committee.
VII.

GUBERNATORIAL AND LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF
INTERPRETATIVE RULES

Undoubtedly, as Bonfield writes, the provisions for gubernatorial and legislative review of agency rules are among the
171
Model Act's "most important and controversial innovations."
Even if these provisions are accepted for the review of legislative rules, all the doubts expressed about the review process are
magnified with respect to interpretative rules, which also are
subject to it. The governor and the legislative rules review
committee are not as competent as the agency, let alone a
court, to interpret the enabling statute or the legislative rules
adopted by the agency. We should not lightly countenance the
intrusion of political considerations into this area of law interpretation and law application.
There may also be constitutional objections to the governor's power to rescind or suspend, and the legislative committee's power to object to, all or part of an interpretative rule on
the ground that their exercise usurps the traditional role of the
judiciary. 172 Bonfield concludes, however, that while "there
may be some residual doubts as to the constitutionality" of the
170. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-204(d)(6), Appendix pp. 602-03 infra.
171. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 550.
172. See Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 659 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam)
(Leventhal, J. concurring), affd mem. sub nom Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950
(1977); Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delega-
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committee's power to object to an agency's rule, this power is
173
likely to be upheld under most, if not all, state constitutions.
These doubts are much stronger with respect to interpretative
rules than legislative rules.
VIII.
A.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES

AGENCY ACTION REVIEWABLE

The Model Act subjects all "final agency action" to judicial
review 174 and defines "agency action" to include "the failure to
issue a rule," as well as "every other species of agency activity. 1u 75 It also subjects nonfinal agency action to judicial review
if "postponement of judicial review would result in an inadequate remedy or irreparable harm disproportionate to the pub1 76
lic benefit derived from postponement.
Bonfield does not discuss the applicability of these provisions to the judicial review of interpretative rules. As I indicated previously, I doubt the wisdom of subjecting to judicial
review an agency's failure to issue interpretative rules. 177 It is
not clear whether the Model Act subjects all interpretative
rules to direct, pre-enforcement review. As examples of nonfinal agency action, Bonfield gives "preliminary or procedural
178
agency action in the course of a rule-making proceeding."
An interpretative rule does not fall into this category. But the
Model Act's definition of nonfinal action is broader than these
examples would indicate. It includes "the whole or a part of an
agency determination, investigation, proceeding, hearing, conference, or other process that the agency intends or is reasonably believed to intend to be preliminary, preparatory,
procedural, or intermediate with regard to subsequent agency
179
action of that agency or another agency."'
An interpretative rule may reasonably be viewed as a detion, The Legislative Veto, and the "Independent"Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV.
1064, 1080-81 (1981).
173. See A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 547. Bonfield does not discuss the
constitutionality of the governor's power over interpretative rules.
174. See MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 5-102, Appendix pp. 604-05 infra.
175. Id. § 1-102(2), Appendix p. 588 infra;see also A. BONFIELD, supra note
5, at 558.
176. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 5-103(2), Appendix p. 605 infra.
177. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
178. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 558.
179. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 5-102(b)(2), Appendix pp. 604-05 infra.
"Final agency action" is defined as "the whole or part of any agency action
other than non-final agency action." Id. § 5-102(b)(1), Appendix p. 604 infra.
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termination "preparatory .. . or intermediate with regard to
subsequent agency action."' 8 0 If so, there would be only a limited right to secure direct judicial review of the rule.' 8 ' Such a
reading of the Model Act would put it more in conformity with
current federal law than a reading that allows direct review of
all interpretative rules. The validity of an interpretative rule
usually comes into question when it is reflected in some other
action taken by the agency-an adjudication or enforcement
proceeding, for example-or is material to an issue raised in an
action between private parties. 8 2 On the federal level, review
of an interpretative rule is normally postponed until the subsequent action is reviewed. 8 3 It will then be reviewed on the basis of the record made in the proceeding involving that action.
Yet a particular interpretative rule may be subject to direct,
pre-enforcement review if it is "a general, interpretative ruling
signed by the head[s] of an agency" that "has been crystallized
following reflective examination in the course of the agency's
interpretative process"; 8 4 there is not. "in preparation or imminent" an enforcement action "close in time" that "permits an
equally convenient determination" of the validity of the interpretative rule; 8 5 the issue of validity of the interpretative rule
does not "turn on the development of specific fact situations,"'18 6 so that "[t]here is no 'record' to be studied or made"
except "that established by such materials as the law and its
legislative history"; 8 7 the parties seeking direct review of the
interpretative rule will suffer hardship if review is postponed; 8 8 and "the [judicial] determination in [the direct review
18 9
proceeding] will have a reasonably broad res judicata effect."'
If the Model Act is read to make all interpretative rules
subject to direct pre-enforcement review, it should be changed
by states that adopt it so that an interpretative rule is nonfinal
180. Id § 5-102(b)(2), Appendix pp. 604-05 infra.
181. See id. § 5-103, Appendix p. 605 infra.
182. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (civil suit by employees to recover damages for overtime pay required interpretation under the
administrative regulations of whether the hours in question were "hours
worked" under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
183. See National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443
F.2d 689, 698-701 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
184. Id. at 702.
185. Id. at 703.
186. I&
187. Id. at 695.
188. Id. at 696.
189. Id. at 704.
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agency action subject to a limited right to direct review-limited in accordance with Judge Leventhal's opinion in National
Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council.1 90
B.

STANDING, EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

AND RIPENESS

Unlike FAPA, the Model Act courageously specifies the requirements that a person must meet to have standing to obtain
judicial review of agency action. Both the "injury in fact" 19 1
and "zone of interests"'192 requirements must be satisfied. The
latter test for standing is stated most succinctly and admirably:
the "person's asserted interests [must be] among those that the
agency was required to consider when it engaged in the agency
1 93
action challenged."'
Unlike FAPA, too, the Model Act also specifies in unexceptionable fashion the elements of the doctrine that a person
may seek judicial review only after exhausting available administrative remedies. 94 The Model Act, however, says nothing
about the ripeness doctrine, except to the extent that the doctrine is inherent in the Model Act's provisions that guarantee
to persons who satisfy all other requirements the right to judicial review of final agency action but confer on such persons
only a limited right to judicial review of nonfinal agency action.
But even under federal law, which has greatly expanded the direct, pre-enforcement review of legislative rules,195 certain legislative rules, though constituting final agency action, may still
not be ripe for judicial review. 96 Bonfield does not discuss the
applicability of the ripeness doctrine under the Model Act. It
190. I& at 702 ("The ultimate question is whether the problems generated
by pre-enforcement review are of such a nature that, taken together, they out-

weigh the hardship and interest of plaintiff's members and establish that judicial review of the interpretative ruling should be deferred."); see also supra
notes 183-89 and accompanying text. This case allowed direct, pre-enforcement review of an interpretative rule of the Administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor that coin-operated laundries were
subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended in 1966. Id. at 691.
191. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152 (1970).
192. Id. at 153.
193. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 5-106(a)(5)(ii), Appendix p. 606 infra.
194. Id. § 5-107, Appendix pp. 606-07 infra.
195. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)
("[Jiudicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be
cut off unless there is a persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose
of Congress."); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 168 (1967) (same).
196. See, e.g., Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 162-63 (Although
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would be unfortunate if the Model Act intended to discard the
ripeness doctrine entirely. Reviewing courts should have discretion to determine the ripeness of particular legislative rules
for direct, pre-enforcement review.
C.

THE RECORD FOR JUDICAL REVIEW

1.

Nonexclusivity of Administrative Rulemaking Record

I have elsewhere 97 lamented the fact that, by requiring
the informal administrative rulemaking record to be the exclusive basis for judicial review and, consequently, for administrative decision, judicial decisions and provisions in some enabling
statutes have eliminated the radical difference FAPA makes
between the procedures prescribed for informal, notice-andcomment rulemaking 198 and those prescribed for formal, onthe-record rulemaking. 199 This development has contributed
significantly to the length and complexity of federal rulemakjudicial review to
ing proceedings and has encouraged resort to
20 0
upset adopted rules on procedural grounds.
For these reasons, I have suggested that the administrative
procedures for rulemaking not be formulated with the thought
of building a record for judicial review.20 1 Any person seeking
to attack the validity of a rule should be required first to file a
protest against the rule with the agency. The agency would
then conduct an on-the-record, though not necessarily a trialtype, proceeding to determine the merits of the protest. The
agency's disposition of the protest would be subject to judicial
review on the basis, exclusively, of the record made in the protest proceeding.20 2
the regulation in question was "final agency action," the factors supporting judicial resolution were still outweighed by other considerations of ripeness.).
197. See generally Auerbach, supra note 115, at 16 ("This article proposes a
return to the original understanding of the APA which distinguishes between
the administrative proceedings on the basis of which an agency promulgates an
informal rule and the record on the basis of which the courts determine the
rule's validity.").
198. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
199. Id. §§ 553(c), 556, 557.
200. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (challenging revised EPA regulations on procedural grounds). An observer of the
Washington scene has described federal rulemaking as "a central horror of
contemporary Washington as well as a primary source of income for its lawyers." Kaus, Creating the American Rules by Agencies of Alphabet Soup, Los
Angeles Times, May 25, 1986, at V1, col. 5.
201. Auerbach, supra note 115, at 61.
202. See id. at 61-68.

1987]

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING

575

The Model Act does not accept this suggestion. Nevertheless, it rejects the notion of an exclusive administrative
rulemaking record for purposes of judicial review. For this reason alone, it is preferable to the developing federal law. It does,
however, make important concessions to the concept of an exclusive administrative rulemaking record that are unnecessary
and unwise.
2.

The Official Agency Rulemaking Record

The Model Act calls for the making of an "official rulemaking record" for each proposed or adopted rule. 20 3 Bonfield
reads this requirement very broadly to include in this record
"[w]ritten materials from inside or outside the agency that
were in its possession prior to the formal proposal of a rule, as
well as materials that come into its possession after the start of
[the rulemaking] proceeding, [if they] relate in some way to the
'formulation' or 'proposal' of the rule" and even if the agency
20 4
heads did not consider them but agency employees did.
Ex parte oral communications need not be summarized in
writing and included in the official rulemaking record. 205 Such
communications are not prohibited by the Model Act because
they are essential to the implementation of the political model
of administrative lawmaking. These oral communications, Bonfield explains, convey to the agency the kind of information and
subject it to the pressure "that would be focused on the legislature if it sought to make [the] rules itself. '20 They make possible off-the-record negotiations that will help to assure the
acceptability of the rules to the legislature and the community
207
at large.
The issue of ex parte oral communications in informal
rulemaking is one of the thorniest issues in current administrative law. Bonfield handles it with full awareness of its implications, but some of his conclusions need to be qualified. In the
first place, the distinction between oral and written communications is difficult to justify in all cases. Ex parte written communications also are not barred by the Model Act but, unlike
ex parte oral communications, they must be included in the official rulemaking record. Yet off-the-record written communi203.
204.

MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 3-112, Appendix pp. 597-98 infra.
A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 330.

205. Id. at 331.
206.

Id. at 333-34.

207. Id. at 334.
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cations may also be necessary to facilitate negotiations and
assure the political acceptability of the rules.
More is involved than the accommodation of the rationality
and political models of rulemaking. 20 8 As Bonfield indicates,
there also is involved the question whether ex parte communications deprive parties of fair opportunity to challenge the factual and other justifications for the rule2 0 9-- an issue of
fundamental fairness bordering on constitutional due process.
Of course, a challenged rule will stand or fall on the basis
of the factual support for it in the record to which the reviewing court is confined, whether that record is the administrative
rulemaking record, a record made anew in the court, or the administrative record plus whatever supplementation is permitted
during the course of the review proceedings. Fairness requires
that the parties challenging the rule should have had full opportunity to comment on this factual support before the court
decides the matter. So long as this opportunity is afforded, it
may not matter whether there were also ex parte oral or written communications to the agency that were not made part of
the record for judicial review. Yet if these communications,
written or oral, contain factual material bearing upon the merits of the rule, failure to disclose that material to the parties
challenging the rule may diminish the insight and effectiveness
with which they will be able to attack the record support for
the rule.
Fairness to affected parties may be assured, Bonfield recognizes, by allowing ex parte oral communications but requiring
them "to be summarized in writing and . . . included in the
agency rule-making record" 210 whenever they contain "factual
material relevant to the technical merits of a proposed rule."211
Requiring all written, but not oral, communications to be included in the record may then be justified because "it is unlikely that significant or dispositive factual information
relevant to the technical merits of a proposed rule will often be
communicated to an agency through oral ex parte communications," 212 but the reverse is true about written ex parte
208.

Bonfield explains the result in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d

9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), on the ground that the prohibition of ex parte oral communications in that case was thought essential to implement the rationality model
of rulemaking. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 336.
209. Id. at 338.
210. Id. at 340.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 341.
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communications.
This is the "compromise" adopted in Sierra Club v.
Costle,21 3 which Bonfield states the Model Act rejected. 214 With
all due respect to the reporter-draftsmen of the Model Act, this
conclusion needs important modification. Like the Model Act,
neither FAPA nor the Clean Air Act involved in Sierra Club v.
Costle bans ex parte oral or written communication. Like the
Model Act, the Clean Air Act requires all written communications, but not such ex parte oral communications, to be included in the rulemaking record.21 5 Unlike the Model Act,
however, the Clean Air Act provides that the administrative
rulemaking record is to be exclusive for purposes of agency action and judicial review. 216 Under the Model Act, "the agency
rulemaking record need not constitute the exclusive basis for
agency action on that rule or for judicial review thereof." 217
Because of the exclusivity of the administrative rulemaking record under the Clean Air Act, the court in Sierra Club v.
Costle took the position that ex parte oral communications
made to the EPA during its consideration of regulations to control the emissions of new coal-burning electric power plants
had to be summarized in writing and included in the record if
they contained "information central to the justification of the
rule." 218 If the parties challenging the EPA regulations were to
have full opportunity to comment on such information, and the
administrative record was to be exclusive, they had to be given
this opportunity before the agency completed its rulemaking
proceeding.
Although Bonfield explains that the Model Act rejects this
"compromise" or "solution" of Sierra Club v. Costle,2 19 nothing
in the language of the Model Act would prevent the parties
challenging a rule from persuading the reviewing court to require ex parte oral communications containing factual information critical to a proposed rule to be summarized in writing and
213. 657 F.2d 298, 404, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that all written reponses
prior to promulgation from the executive branch should be docketed, id at
404; however, documentation of such oral ex parte proceedings need not be
docketed unless the rule is based "on any 'information or data' arising from
that meeting," id at 407).
214. See A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 340.
215. See Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 392 n.464 (citing, in part, the Clean Air
Act, § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)).
216. See id.
217. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 3-112(c), Appendix pp. 597-98 infra.
218. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 402, 407.
219. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 340.
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added to the record for judicial review, together with the comments of the parties on this information. The purpose served
by the Sierra Club v. Costle solution would thus be served
under the Model Act, but at the judicial review stage and not
during the rulemaking proceeding.
Bonfield apparently accepts this conclusion when he writes
that "[i]f an agency fails to disclose adequately the contents of
an ex parte communication that is relevant to the merits of a
proposed rule, and opposing parties are seriously prejudiced
thereby, the failure can be challenged on judicial review. ' 220
But it would never be necessary in such a case, as Bonfield supposes, to reverse the agency's action with respect to the particular rule. 221 It would only be necessary, as indicated above, for

the reviewing court to order that the contents of these ex parte
communications be added to the record and provide an opportunity to the opposing parties to comment on the contents.
In sum, agencies should be required to summarize in writing and include in the administrative rulemaking record all ex
parte oral or written communications containing "information
central to the justification of the rule." But the failure of an
agency to do so should not invalidate the rule. Instead, the
court should require this information to be disclosed and commented upoh at the judicial review stage.
3. The Agency Record for Judicial Review
The Model Act provides that the agency record for judicial
review may consist not only of the official agency rulemaking
record, but also of documents that may not have been inserted
in that record but are "identified by the agency as having been
considered by it before its action and used as a basis for its action." 222 Furthermore, the agency record for judicial review
may be supplemented by additional evidence taken in a number
223
of different ways.

The reviewing court may remand the matter to the agency
if it finds that
new evidence has become available that relates to the validity of the
agency action at the time it was taken, that one or more of the parties
did not know and was under no duty to discover, or did not know and
was under a duty to discover but could not reasonably have discovered, until after the agency action, and the interests of justice would
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 338.
Id. at 339.
MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 5-115(a), Appendix p. 609 infra.

Id §§ 5-113, 5-115, Appendix pp. 608-09 infra.
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224
. . . the agency improperly exbe served by remand to the agency;
225
or... a relevant procluded or omitted evidence from the record;
court
vision of law changed after the agency action and the
226
determines that the new provision may control the outcome.

If remand to the agency is not warranted, the court itself
may receive additional evidence relating to
the validity of the agency action at the time it was taken and ...
needed to decide disputed issues regarding... improper constitution
as a decision-making body, or improper motive or grounds for disqualification, of those taking the agency action; ... unlawfulness of procedure or of decision-making process; or ... any material fact that was
not required by any provision of law to be determined exclusively2 2on
7
an agency record of a type reasonably suitable for judicial review.

This last provision would enable those challenging the rule to
refute or comment on the material facts in the agency record
for judicial review that were not inserted in the agency
rulemaking record. It would also enable the agency to add material facts buttressing its rule.
The Uniform Law Commissioners suggest, as an alternative to the reviewing court itself receiving additional evidence,
that the court, "having due regard for the convenience of the
parties," appoint a referee, master, or trial court judge to do
SO.

228

Bonfield recognizes that the Model Act provision authorizing the reviewing court to remand a matter to the agency is a
"partial substitute" for my proposed protest proceeding. 229 But
even if the protest procedure is not adopted, why should the
Model Act limit the reviewing court's authority to remand?
Why should not the reviewing court be encouraged to remand
to the agency whenever it decides it is appropriate to do so in
light of the issues raised by the challengers' or agency's offer of
additional evidence? Generally, a remand is the more desirable
alternative. If a reviewing court remands, instead of itself receiving additional evidence that bears on the merits of the
agency action, the agency will take the opportunity to reconsider its action and modify it to meet valid objections. It may
224. 1& § 5-114(b)(2), Appendix p. 608 infra.
225. Id. § 5-114(b)(3), Appendix pp. 608-09 infra.
226. Id. § 5-114(b)(4), Appendix pp. 608-09 infra. Section 5-114(b)(1)
authorizes a remand if "the agency was required by [the Model] Act or
other provision of law to base its action exclusively on a record of a type
sonably suitable for judicial review, but the agency failed to prepare or
serve an adequate record." Id. § 5-114(b)(1), Appendix p. 608 infra.
227. Id § 5-114(a), Appendix p. 608 infra.
228. Id-; see also id. Alternative B § 5-104(c), Appendix p. 605 infra.
229. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 568 n.21.

also
any
reapre-
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be reluctant to take such steps when placed in the adversary
position of defending its action in court.
Furthermore, why is the reviewing court merely authorized but not required to take additional evidence under the
specified conditions? The need for such a requirement is urgent because the Model Act provides that "a petitioner for judicial review of a rule need not have participated in the rulemaking proceeding upon which that rule is based, or have petitioned for its amendment or repeal. '2 30 Such a petitioner
should have the right to adduce at the judicial review stage
whatever evidence it has that challenges the validity of the
rule.
4.

The Time When Validity of a Rule Is To Be Determined

The Model Act requires the reviewing court to determine
the validity of the agency action "at the time it was taken."' 23 '
Bonfield clarifies this limitation in important ways. He points
out that the term "agency action" includes not only the initial
adoption of a rule but also "subsequent agency action relying
upon that rule as effective law. ' 232 Thus, a petition for judicial
review may challenge an agency's "subsequent reliance on the
rule, '233 and its validity must be determined "exclusively on
the basis of the factual and legal circumstances relevant to its
legality" at the time the agency relies upon the rule.2 34 New
evidence, therefore, may be offered as to these factual and legal
circumstances. If this new evidence demonstrates illegality, the
rule should be held to be illegal "only for the period subsequent to the existence" of the evidence, assuming, of course,
the rule "was legal at the time it was initially adopted, on the
basis of factors relevant to [its] legality . . . at the time of its
adoption. 2 35 Bonfield further explains that "material created
or accumulated subsequent to the adoption of a rule will often
be relevant to the legality of the rule at the time it was initially
adopted" and so may be offered to supplement the agency record in a judicial review proceeding challenging the rule at the
230. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 5-107(1), Appendix p. 606 infra.
231. Id. §§ 5-116(a)(2), 5-114, Appendix pp. 608-09 infra.
232. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 571. The Model Act's definition of
"agency action" does not spell this out. See MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 1102(2), Appendix p. 588 infra.
233. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 571.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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time of adoption.2 36
5.

Limitation of Issues That May Be Raised on Review

At the same time, the agency and the parties supporting
the rule may use "[o]nly the ['particular factual, legal, and policy' 237] reasons contained in the concise explanatory statement
238
... as justifications for the adoption of the rule."
But "the
agency may, in a proceeding challenging the validity of the
rule, add further materials to the existing agency rule-making
record to demonstrate the propriety of those particular reasons
contained in the concise explanatory statement." 239
Few would dispute the soundness of Bonfield's view that
agencies should not be permitted "to offer at a later time false,
but convenient, rationalizations for their earlier, otherwise unsupportable actions. '2 40 Even so, Bonfield does not fully take
account of the fact that the Model Act does not make the
agency rulemaking record the exclusive record for judicial review.2 41 Any person challenging a rule, having participated in
the rulemaking proceeding or not, may raise in the reviewing
court issues that were not raised before the agency, provided
only that "the person has not been a party in adjudicative proceedings which provided an adequate opportunity to raise"
these issues. 24 The challenger may introduce new evidence
that is material to these issues. Even without raising new issues, those challenging a rule may supplement the record with
new material evidence attacking the legislative facts upon
which the rule is based. The agency, of course, may meet the
new issues and the new evidence. Out of this exchange new
reasons for the rule may emerge. Why should not these new
justifications be considered by the reviewing court?
Bonfield fears that
236. Id. at 572.
237. See id. at 316; see also supra text accompanying note 116.
238. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 3-110(b), Appendix p. 596 infra.
239. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 316.

240. I& at 319.
241. All the cases cited by Bonfield in support of the provision in question
assume that the formal adjudicatory record or informal rulemaking record
will be the exclusive record for judicial review purposes. See, e.g., Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87, 95 (1943); Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agric.,
514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass'n
v. Environmental Quality Council, 590 P.2d 1324, 1330-33 (Wyo. 1979).
242. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 5-112(3), Appendix p. 607 infra.
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if agencies could rely, in defending their rules, on reasons invented
subsequent to the adoption of those rules, they could also make their
rules in a way that would entirely remove from the scrutiny of the
rule-making process those later justifications
which ultimately be243
come the basis for upholding the rule.

But if this occurred, the parties challenging the rule would
have full opportunity during the judicial review proceedings to
refute these reasons with additional evidence and argument.
This may also produce a situation in which the reviewing court
would remand the matter to the agency. There is no reason to
assume that the agency, aware of these possibilities, would
rather litigate the validity of the new reasons than consider
them in the rulemaking process whenever that was possible.
Bonfield's concern would be alleviated if the reviewing
court required the agency to amend its explanatory statement
whenever the agency wished to add to, delete, or change the
reasons for the rule incorporated in the statement. This would
assure the reviewing court that the agency itself was taking this
action and that the court was not faced with post-hoc rationalizations invented by lawyers anxious to win a case.
Bonfield acknowledges that the limitation of the agency to
the reasons contained in the concise explanatory statement is
not "foolproof." 244 "An agency bent on making a rule for the
wrong reasons may do so... if it is careful enough to provide a
statement of reasons for cosmetic effect." 245 But does not the
limitation in question give added encouragement to such statements of reasons? Will there not also be fruitless litigation
about whether agency statements of reasons, which will become more and more general because of this limitation, encompass the particular justifications advanced by the agency in the
judicial review proceeding?
I may be forgiven mention of the fact that my suggested
protest procedure would completely obviate these difficulties
envisaged by Bonfield. In any case, when a rule otherwise lawful is challenged because the reasons justifying it were not articulated in the concise explanatory statement to the reviewing
court's satisfaction, the proper course of action would be for the
court to remand the matter to the agency and not, as Bonfield
contends, to invalidate the rule and require the agency to initi246
ate an entirely new rulemaking proceeding.
243.

A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 319.

244.
245.
246.

Id. at 320.
Id.
See id. Although the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's)
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Finally, it should be noted that the limitation in question
initial order in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943) (CheneryI) was
set aside, the case was remanded to the agency and the SEC's new order was
upheld even though it was applied retroactively. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 203, 207 (1947) (Chenery I). Relying, in part, on Chenery I, the
Supreme Court also remanded to the agency in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549
(1978), to allow the agency to reconsider an action that was not sustainable on
the informal administrative rulemaking record; it did not require the agency
to institute a new rulemaking proceeding. See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138,
142-43 (1973) ("If... there was such failure to explain administrative action as
to frustrate effective judicial review, the remedy was not to hold a de novo
hearing but ....
to obtain from the agency, either through affidavits or testimony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the agency decision as
may prove necessary.").
National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir.
1975), and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972), are
in accord with Vermont Yankee, although both were decided before that case.
In National NutritionalFoods Ass'n, the Second Circuit found the FDA Commissioner's stated reason for a rule classifying high potency vitamins as "prescription drugs" (their potential toxicity in high doses, 512 F.2d at 692, and
demonstrated uselessness as food for most people make them "appropriate
only for therapeutic purposes," id. at 693, 703) to be insufficient as a matter of
law. I& at 703. It remanded the matter to the agency to enable it to adduce a
different reason that was legally sufficient and might be supported by the record ("higher dosage forms [vitamins] were used almost exclusively for therapeutic purposes"). Id. In Kennecott, the court found that the informal
rulemaking requirement of a "concise general statement" of the basis and purpose of the regulation had been satisfied but that the statement provided was
not sufficient to allow judicial review. The record was remanded to the Administrator to supply an implementing statement for judicial review. 462 F.2d
at 850-51.
In Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir.
1975), the agency failed to follow any of the informal rulemaking procedures
of 5 U.S.C. § 553 with respect to the challenged rules. Rodway, 514 F.2d at 814.
No notice of the proposed rules was given, no comments respecting them were
received, and no statement of their basis and purpose was issued. Id No administrative rulemaking record was compiled. Id. at 816. Because of these deficiencies, the agency was required to institute a new proceeding. Id. at 817. In
view of their importance, however, the challenged rules were left in place
pending the outcome of the new proceeding. Id.
In Tabor v. Joint Bd. for the Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), the reviewing court vacated the rules and remanded for the institution of a new rulemaking proceeding, but only because, as in Rodway, the
agency accompanied the issuance of the rule with no published statement of
its basis and purpose, but sought to produce such a statement as a litigation
document. Id. at 709, 712. The D.C. Circuit stressed not only the "potential
unreliability" of such a litigation document but also the fact that "the Board's
failure to publish a contemporaneous statement of basis and purpose made it
practically impossible to file an intelligent petition for reconsideration . . . a
method of challenge less expensive and time consuming than judicial review."
Id. at 711. Nevertheless, one may question whether it may not have been preferable, even in this situation, to remand to the agency to give it the alternative
of producing a statement of basis and purpose consistent with the record
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makes no sense whatsoever with regard to the judicial review
of interpretative rules, whether or not adopted in accordance
with the rulemaking procedures applicable to legislative rules.
Nor, indeed, do the Model Act's provisions regarding the
agency record for judicial review and its supplementation in the
reviewing court make sense for interpretative rules.
6.

Scope of Review

The standards for judicial review of rulemaking specified
in the Model Act 247 are, on the whole "familiar and non'248
controversial.
a.

The Substantial Evidence Test.

Unlike FAPA, however, the Model Act provides that the
reviewing court may set aside agency action "based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court. '249 Bonfield explains that
"the 'substantial evidence' standard .

.

. applies to judicial re-

view of legislative facts on which a rule rests." 250 Under
FAPA, the substantial evidence standard applies only to formal, on-the-record rulemaking; if the rule is the result of informal, notice-and-comment rulemaking, the "arbitrary, capri25
cious, an abuse of discretion" standard applies. '
On the whole, Bonfield may be correct that the use of the
substantial evidence standard to review the legislative facts underlying a rule is likely to produce the same result as use of the
arbitrary and capricious standard. 252 Yet it may alter the represented to the court for review or reopening the rulemaking proceeding to
supplement that record.

In Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass'n v. Environmental Quality
Council, 590 P.2d 1324 (Wyo. 1979), the agency did not state any reasons for its
rule. See id. at 1329. The rule was not invalidated, nor was the agency required to start an entirely new proceeding; it was simply asked to state its reasons for the challenged rule formally. Id. at 1332.
247. MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 5-116, Appendix pp. 609-10 infra.
248. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 574.
249. MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 5-116(c)(7), Appendix pp. 609-10 infra.
250. A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 576.
251. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E). Section 706(2)(E) also makes the substantial
evidence standard applicable if the rule is "otherwise reviewed on the record
of an agency hearing provided by statute." This provision would not apply to
these cases in which the courts, without such a statutory provision, have imposed the concept of an exclusive administrative informal rulemaking record
for purposes of judicial review.
252. See A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 576.
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viewing court's approach to its task in cases like Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson.253 Reviewing standards
fixed by the Secretary of Labor under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA) to limit the atmospheric concentrations of asbestos dust in industrial work places, Judge McGowan drew a distinction in that case between two categories
of legislative fact determinations. 25 The first category consists
of legislative fact determinations based on the evaluation of
data and conclusions drawn therefrom. The court, according to
Judge McGowan, is able to apply the substantial evidence standard to these determinations; it "can review that data in the
record and determine whether it reflects substantial support
for the Secretary's findings. ' 255 The other category consists of
legislative fact determinations "on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge [as to which] insufficient data is presently available
to make a fully informed factual determination. '256 In this
area, "[d]ecision making must ... depend to a greater extent
upon policy judgments and less upon purely factual
'257
analysis.
Judge McGowan continued: "[P]olicy choices . . . are not
susceptible to the same type of verification or refutation by reference to the record as are some factual questions. Consequently, the court's approach must necessarily be different no
matter how the standards of review are labeled." 258 In reviewing the policy choices, the court will require the agency to identify carefully the reasons why it chose "to follow one course
rather than another. ' 259 If the choice "purports to be based on
the existence of certain determinable facts, [the agency] must,
in form as well as substance, find those facts from evidence in
the record. '260 If the agency "is obliged to make policy judgments where no factual certainties exist or where facts alone
do not provide the answer, [the agency] should so state261and go
on to identify the considerations [it] found persuasive."
It may be that state reviewing courts will adopt the approach under the Model Act's substantial evidence test that
253. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

254. Id. at 469-70.
255. Id. at 474.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id. at 475-76.
Id. at 476.
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Judge McGowan adopted under OSHA's substantial evidence
test. State courts will be encouraged to do so by Bonfield's view
that "the actual substance of the test used by courts to determine the legality of agency fact-finding in rule making is the
same" under the Model Act as under FAPA.2 62 Under both the

"substantial evidence" and "arbitrary or capricious" standards,
"courts must uphold agency fact-finding if it is rational-that
is,
if it is within the range of well-considered dispassionate judgment. '26 3 Nevertheless, the Model Act would have a better
chance of achieving this desirable result if it embodied the "arbitrary or capricious," rather than the "substantial evidence,"
standard for the review of the legislative facts underlying the
adopted rule. The former standard is appropriate for both the
categories of legislative fact determinations distinguished by
Judge McGowan; the latter is not.
b. ErroneousInterpretationor Application of Law.
The Model Act also authorizes the reviewing court to invalidate a rule if the agency "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law.

' 26 4

Bonfield is displeased with this provision

because it does not "adequately identify... those matters as to
which a reviewing court may substitute its judgment de novo
for that of the agency, and those matters entrusted to authoritative agency resolution over which a court has only limited review powers. '2 65 He urges state reviewing courts to read this
provision in light of the Uniform Law Commissioners' comment, which distinguishes between the scope of review of the
agency's interpretation of law and the scope of review of the
agency's application of law. The comment states that "a court
may decide that the agency has erroneously interpreted the law
if the court merely disagrees with the agency's interpretation
[but] a court should find reversible error in the agency's application of the law only if the agency has improperly exercised its
discretion." 26 6 Bonfield finds this distinction "to be sound in
principle." 267
The Model Act provision in question, we may agree, is
poorly drafted. It also reveals the pitfalls of drafting too de262.

A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 577.

263. Id.
264.
265.
266.

MODEL AcT, supra note 4, § 5-116(c)(4), Appendix pp. 609-10 infra.
A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 587-88.
Id. at 584 (quoting MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 5-116 comment).

267. Id.
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tailed standards for judicial review. The generalization in the
comment is to be preferred over the generalization in the provision in question. But even the generalization in the comment is
not always valid. The scope of review may depend on the nature of the issue being raised. Courts often do not overturn an
agency interpretation, even if they disagree with it, if both the
agency interpretation and the interpretation the court would
adopt independently are reasonably born by the statutory language and are consistent with the statutory purpose but the
agency reasonably maintains that its interpretation will better
effectuate the statutory objectives. On the other hand, agency
application of law often has legal aspects and raises issues that
Bonfield recognizes 26 8 the reviewing court should determine
independently.
CONCLUSION
Assessing the Model Act as a whole, I find that many of my
objections to particular provisions of the Model Act are provoked by one of its central characteristics. The Model Act, and
often Bonfield's justifications, assume agencies are capable of
the worst and so procedures must be devised to prevent the
worst from happening. This assumption may reflect the realities of current state government in action. Nevertheless, legislatures considering the adoption of a new administrative
procedure act should appreciate that agencies must have a modicum of official, if not popular, trust if they are to be effective
instruments of democratic government. The effort to control
be
may
tightly
too
process
the
administrative
counterproductive.
Yet, all in all, the Model Act is so superior to the existing
state administrative procedure acts that it merits adoption, even
without change. Bonfield's book should hasten its adoption and
stimulate scholarly interest in state administrative law.
268.

A. BONFIELD, supra note 5, at 582.
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APPENDIX
Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981)
Principal provisions discussed in the Article
ARTICLE

I GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 1-102. [Definitions]
As used in this Act:
(2)

"Agency action" means:
(i) the whole or a part of a rule or an order;
(ii) the failure to issue a rule or an order; or
(iii) an agency's performance of, or failure to perform, any other duty, function, or activity, discretionary or otherwise.
(5) "Order" means an agency action of particular applicability that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more
specific persons. [The term does not include an "executive
order" issued by the governor pursuant to Section 1-104 or
3-202.]
(10) "Rule" means the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes (i) law or policy, or (ii) the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.
The term includes the amendment, repeal, or suspension of
an existing rule.
(11) "Rule making" means the process for formulation and adoption of a rule.
ARTICLE

II PUBLIC ACCESS TO AGENCY LAW AND POLICY

§ 2-101. [Administrative Rules Editor;Publication,
Compilation, Indexing, and Public Inspection of Rules]
(a) There is created, within the executive branch, an [administrative rules editor]. The governor shall appoint the [administrative rules editor] who shall serve at the pleasure of the
governor.
(c)

The [administrative rules editor] shall cause the [ad-
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ministrative bulletin] to be published in pamphlet form [once
each week].... The [administrative bulletin] must contain:
(1) notices of proposed rule adoption prepared so that
the text of the proposed rule shows the text of any existing
rule proposed to be changed and the change proposed;
(2) newly filed adopted rules prepared so that the
text of the newly filed adopted rule shows the text of any
existing rule being changed and the change being made;
(3) any other notices and materials designated by
[law] [the administrative rules editor] for publication
therein; and
(4) an index to its contents by subject.
(d) The [administrative rules editor] shall cause the [administrative code] to be compiled, indexed by subject, and published [in loose-leaf form]. All of the effective rules of each
agency must be published and indexed in that publication....
(e) The [administrative rules editor] may omit from the
[administrative bulletin or code] any proposed or filed adopted
rule the publication of which would be unduly cumbersome, expensive, or otherwise inexpedient, if:
(1) knowledge of the rule is likely to be important to
only a small class of persons;
(2) on application to the issuing agency, the proposed
or adopted rule in printed or processed form is made available at no more than its cost of reproduction; and
(3) the [administrative bulletin or code] contains a
notice stating in detail the specific subject matter of the
omitted proposed or adopted rule and how a copy of the
omitted material may be obtained.
(g) Except as otherwise required by a provision of law,
subsections (c) through (f) do not apply to rules governed by
Section 3-116, and the following provisions apply instead:
(1) Each agency shall maintain an official, current,
and dated compilation that is indexed by subject, containing all of its rules within the scope of Section 3-116. Each
addition to, change in, or deletion from the official compilation must also be dated, indexed, and a record thereof kept.
Except for those portions containing rules governed by Section 3-116(2), the compilation must be made available for
public inspection and copying. Certified copies of the full
compilation must also be furnished to the [secretary of
state, the administrative rules counsel, and members of the
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administrative rules review committee], and be kept current by the agency at least every [30] days.
(2) A rule subject to the requirements of this subsection may not be relied on by an agency to the detriment of
any person who does not have actual, timely knowledge of
the contents of the rule until the requirements of paragraph (1) are satisfied. The burden of proving that knowledge is on the agency. This provision is also inapplicable to
the extent necessary to avoid imminent peril to the public
health, safety, or welfare.
§ 2-104. [RequiredRule Making]
In addition to other rule-making requirements imposed by
law, each agency shall:
(1) adopt as a rule a description of the organization of
the agency which states the general course and method of
its operations and where and how the public may obtain information or make submissions or requests;
(2) adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature
and requirements of all formal and informal procedures
available to the public, including a description of all forms
and instructions that are to be used by the public in dealing
with the agency; [and]
(3) as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable,
adopt rules, in addition to those otherwise required by this
Act, embodying appropriate standards, principles, and procedural safeguards that the agency will apply to the law it
administers[; and] [.]
[(4) as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable,
adopt rules to supersede principles of law or policy lawfully
declared by the agency as the basis for its decisions in particular cases.]
ARTICLE III RULE MAKING

Chapter I Adoption and Effectiveness of Rules
§ 3-101. [Advice on Possible Rules before Notice of Proposed
Rule Adoption]
(a) In addition to seeking information by other methods,
an agency, before publication of a notice of proposed rule adoption under Section 3-103, may solicit comments from the public
on a subject matter of possible rule making under active consideration within the agency by causing notice to be published in
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the [administrative bulletin] of the subject matter and indicating where, when, and how persons may comment.
(b) Each agency may also appoint committees to comment, before publication of a notice of proposed rule adoption
under Section 3-103, on the subject matter of a possible rule
making under active consideration within the agency. The
membership of those committees must be published at least
[annually] in the [administrative bulletin].
§ 3-102. [PublicRule-Making Docket]
(a) Each agency shall maintain a current, public rulemaking docket.
(b) The rule-making docket [must] [may] contain a listing
of the precise subject matter of each possible rule currently
under active consideration within the agency for proposal
under Section 3-103, the name and address of agency personnel
with whom persons may communicate with respect to the matter, and an indication of the present status within the agency of
that possible rule.
(c) The rule-making docket must list each pending rulemaking proceeding. A rule-making proceeding is pending from
the time it is commenced, by publication of a notice of proposed
rule adoption, to the time it is terminated, by publication of a
notice of termination or the rule becoming effective. For each
rule-making proceeding, the docket must indicate:
(1) the subject matter of the proposed rule;
(2) a citation to all published notices relating to the
proceeding;
(3) where written submissions on the proposed rule
may be inspected;
(4) the time during which written submissions may
be made;
(5) the names of persons who have made written requests for an opportunity to make oral presentations on
the proposed rule, where those requests may be inspected,
and where and when oral presentations may be made;
(6) whether a written request for the issuance of a
regulatory analysis of the proposed rule has been filed,
whether that analysis has been issued, and where the written request and analysis may be inspected;
(7) the current status of the proposed rule and any
agency determinations with respect thereto;
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(8) any known timetable for agency decisions or
other action in the proceeding;
(9) the date of the rule's adoption;
(10) the date of the rule's filing, indexing, and publication; and
(11) when the rule will become effective.
§ 3-103. [Notice of Proposed Rule Adoption]
(a) At least [30] days before the adoption of a rule an
agency shall cause notice of its contemplated action to be published in the [administrative bulletin]. The notice of proposed
rule adoption must include:
(1) a short explanation of the purpose of the proposed rule;
(2) the specific legal authority authorizing the proposed rule;
(3) subject to Section 2-101(e), the text of the proposed rule;
(4) where, when, and how persons may present their
views on the proposed rule; and
(5) where, when, and how persons may demand an
oral proceeding on the proposed rule if the notice does not
already provide for one.
(b) Within [3] days after its publication in the [administrative bulletin], the agency shall cause a copy of the notice of proposed rule adoption to be mailed to each person who has made
a timely request to the agency for a mailed copy of the notice.
An agency may charge persons for the actual cost of providing
them with mailed copies.
§ 3-104. [PublicParticipation]
(a) For at least [30] days after publication of the notice of
proposed rule adoption, an agency shall afford persons the opportunity to submit in writing, argument, data, and views on
the proposed rule.
(b)(1) An agency shall schedule an oral proceeding on a
proposed rule if, within [20] days after the published notice
of proposed rule adoption, a written request for an oral
proceeding is submitted by [the administrative rules review
committee,] [the administrative rules counsel,] a political
subdivision, an agency, or [25] persons. At that proceeding,
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persons may present oral argument, data, and views on the
proposed rule.
(2) An oral proceeding on a proposed rule, if required, may not be held earlier than [20] days after notice
of its location and time is published in the [administrative
bulletin].
(3) The agency, a member of the agency, or another
presiding officer designated by the agency, shall preside at
a required oral proceeding on a proposed rule. If the
agency does not preside, the presiding official shall prepare
a memorandum for consideration by the agency summarizing the contents of the presentations made at the oral proceeding. Oral proceedings must be open to the public and
be recorded by stenographic or other means.
(4) Each agency shall issue rules for the conduct of
oral rule-making proceedings. Those rules may include
provisions calculated to prevent undue repetition in the
oral proceedings.
§ 3-105. [Regulatory Analysis]
(a) An agency shall issue a regulatory analysis of a proposed rule if, within [20] days after the published notice of proposed rule adoption, a written request for the analysis is filed in
the office of the [secretary of state] by [the administrative rules
review committee, the governor, a political subdivision, an
agency, or [300] persons signing the request]. The [secretary of
state] shall immediately forward to the agency a certified copy
of the filed request.
(b) Except to the extent that the written request expressly waives one or more of the following, the regulatory
analysis must contain:
(1) a description of the classes of persons who probably will be affected by the proposed rule, including classes
that will bear the costs of the proposed rule and classes
that will benefit from the proposed rule;
(2) a description of the probable quantitative and
qualitative impact of the proposed rule, economic or otherwise, upon affected classes of persons;
(3) the probable costs to the agency and to any other
agency of the implementation and enforcement of the proposed rule and any anticipated effect on state revenues;
(4) a comparison of the probable costs and benefits of
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the proposed rule to the probable costs and benefits of
inaction;
(5) a determination of whether there are less costly
methods or less intrusive methods for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule; and
(6) a description of any alternative methods for
achieving the purpose of the proposed rule that were seriously considered by the agency and the reasons why they
were rejected in favor of the proposed rule.
(c) Each regulatory analysis must include quantification
of the data to the extent practicable and must take account of
both short-term and long-term consequences.
(d) A concise summary of the regulatory analysis must be
published in the [administrative bulletin] at least [10] days
before the earliest of:
(1) the end of the period during which persons may
make written submissions on the proposed rule;
(2) the end of the period during which an oral proceeding may be requested; or
(3) the date of any required oral proceeding on the
proposed rule.
(e) The published summary of the regulatory analysis
must also indicate where persons may obtain copies of the full
text of the regulatory analysis and where, when, and how persons may present their views on the proposed rule and demand
an oral proceeding thereon if one is not already provided.
(f) If the agency has made a good faith effort to comply
with the requirements of subsections (a) through (c), the rule
may not be invalidated on the ground that the contents of the
regulatory analysis are insufficient or inaccurate.
§ 3-106. [Time and Manner of Rule Adoption]
(a) An agency may not adopt a rule until the period for
making written submissions and oral presentations has expired.
(b) Within [180] days after the later of (i) the publication
of the notice of proposed rule adoption, or (ii) the end of oral
proceedings thereon, an agency shall adopt a rule pursuant to
the rule-making proceedings or terminate the proceeding by
publication of a notice to that effect in the [administrative
bulletin].
(c) Before the adoption of a rule, an agency shall consider
the written submissions, oral submissions or any memorandum
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summarizing oral submissions, and any regulatory analysis, provided for by this Chapter.
(d) Within the scope of its delegated authority, an agency
may use its own experience, technical competence, specialized
knowledge, and judgment in the adoption of a rule.
§ 3-10Z [Variance between Adopted Rule and PublishedNotice
of Proposed Rule Adoption]
(a) An agency may not adopt a rule that is substantially
different from the proposed rule contained in the published notice of proposed rule adoption. However, an agency may terminate a rule-making proceeding and commence a new rulemaking proceeding for the purpose of adopting a substantially
different rule.
(b) In determining whether an adopted rule is substantially different from the published proposed rule upon which it
is required to be based, the following must be considered:
(1) the extent to which all persons affected by the
adopted rule should have understood that the published
proposed rule would affect their interests;
(2) the extent to which the subject matter of the
adopted rule or the issues determined by that rule are different from the subject matter or issues involved in the
published proposed rule; and
(3) the extent to which the effects of the adopted rule
differ from the effects of the published proposed rule had
it been adopted instead.
§ 3-108. [GeneralExemption from Public Rule-making
Procedures]
(a) To the extent an agency for good cause finds that any
requirements of Sections 3-103 through 3-107 are unnecessary,
impracticable, or contrary to the public interest in the process
of adopting a particular rule, those requirements do not apply.
The agency shall incorporate the required finding and a brief
statement of its supporting reasons in each rule adopted in reliance upon this subsection.
(b) In an action contesting a rule adopted under subsection (a), the burden is upon the agency to demonstrate that any
omitted requirements of Sections 3-103 through 3-107 were unnecessary, impracticable, or contrary to the public interest in
the particular circumstances involved.
(c) Within [2] years after the effective date of a rule
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adopted under subsection (a), the [administrative rules review
committee or the governor] may request the agency to hold a
rule-making proceeding thereon according to the requirements
of Sections 3-103 through 3-107. The request must be in writing
and filed in the office of the [secretary of state]. The [secretary
of state] shall immediately forward to the agency and to the
[administrative rules editor] a certified copy of the request. Notice of the filing of the request must be published in the next
issue of the [administrative bulletin]. The rule in question
ceases to be effective [180] days after the request is filed. However, an agency, after the filing of the request, may subsequently adopt an identical rule in a rule-making proceeding
conducted pursuant to the requirements of Sections 3-103
through 3-107.
[§ 3-109. /Exemption for CertainRules]
(a) An agency need not follow the provisions of Sections
3-103 through 3-108 in the adoption of a rule that only defines
the meaning of a statute or other provision of law or precedent
if the agency does not possess delegated authority to bind the
courts to any extent with its definition. A rule adopted under
this subsection must include a statement that it was adopted
under this subsection when it is published in the [administrative bulletin], and there must be an indication to that effect adjacent to the rule when it is published in the [administrative
code].
(b) A reviewing court shall determine wholly de novo the
validity of a rule within the scope of subsection (a) that is
adopted without complying with the provisions of Sections 3103 through 3-108.]
§ 3-110. [Concise Explanatory Statement]
(a) At the time it adopts a rule, an agency shall issue a
concise explanatory statement containing:
(1) its reasons for adopting the rule; and
(2) an indication of any change between the text of
the proposed rule contained in the published notice of proposed rule adoption and the text of the rule as finally
adopted, with the reasons for any change.
(b) Only the reasons contained in the concise explanatory
statement may be used by any party as justifications for the
adoption of the rule in any proceeding in which its validity is at
issue.
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§ 3-112. [Agency Rule-making Record]
(a) An agency shall maintain an official rule-making record for each rule it (i) proposes by publication in the [administrative bulletin] of a notice of proposed rule adoption, or (ii)
adopts. The record and materials incorporated by reference
must be available for public inspection.
(b) The agency rule-making record must contain:
(1) copies of all publications in the [administrative
bulletin] with respect to the rule or the proceeding upon
which the rule is based;
(2) copies of any portions of the agency's public rulemaking docket containing entries relating to the rule or
the proceeding upon which the rule is based;
(3) all written petitions, requests, submissions, and
comments received by the agency and all other written
materials considered by the agency in connection with the
formulation, proposal, or adoption of the rule or the proceeding upon which the rule is based;
(4) any official transcript of oral presentations made
in the proceeding upon which the rule is based or, if not
transcribed, any tape recording or stenographic record of
those presentations, and any memorandum prepared by a
presiding official summarizing the contents of those
presentations;
(5) a copy of any regulatory analysis prepared for the
proceeding upon which the rule is based;
(6) a copy of the rule and explanatory statement filed
in the office of the [secretary of state];
(7) all petitions for exceptions to, amendments of, or
repeal or suspension of, the rule;
(8) a copy of any request filed pursuant to Section 3108(c);
[(9) a copy of any objection to the rule filed by the
[administrative rules review committee] pursuant to Section 3-204(d) and the agency's response;] and
(10) a copy of any filed executive order with respect
to the rule.
(c) Upon judicial review, the record required by this section constitutes the official agency rule-making record with respect to a rule. Except as provided in Section 3-110(b) or
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otherwise required by a provision of law, the agency rule-making record need not constitute the exclusive basis for agency action on that rule or for judicial review thereof.
§ 3-113. [Invalidity of Rules Not Adopted According to
Chapter; Time Limitation]
(a) A rule adopted after [date] is invalid unless adopted in
substantial compliance with the provisions of Sections 3-102
through 3-108 and Sections 3-110 through 3-112. However, inadvertent failure to mail a notice of proposed rule adoption to any
person as required by Section 3-103(b) does not invalidate a
rule.
(b) An action to contest the validity of a rule on the
grounds of its noncompliance with any provision of Sections 3102 through 3-108 or Sections 3-110 through 3-112 must be commenced within [2] years after the effective date of the rule.
§ 3-114. [Filingof Rules]
(a) An agency shall file in the office of the [secretary of
state] each rule it adopts and all rules existing on the effective
date of this Act that have not previously been filed. The filing
must be done as soon after adoption of the rule as is practicable. At the time of filing, each rule adopted after the effective
date of this Act must have attached to it the explanatory statement required by Section 3-110. The [secretary of state] shall
affix to each rule and statement a certification of the time and
date of filing and keep a permanent register open to public inspection of all filed rules and attached explanatory statements.
In filing a rule, each agency shall use a standard form prescribed by the [secretary of state].
(b) The [secretary of state] shall transmit to the [administrative rules editor], [administrative rules counsel], and to the
members of the [administrative rules review committee] a certified copy of each filed rule as soon after its filing as is
practicable.
§ 3-115. [Effective Date of Rules]
(a) Except to the extent subsection (b) or (c) provides
otherwise, each rule adopted after the effective date of this Act
becomes effective [30] days after the later of (i) its filing in the
office of the [secretary of state] or (ii) its publication and indexing in the [administrative bulletin].
(b)(1) A rule becomes effective on a date later than that
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established by subsection (a) if a later date is required by
another statute or specified in the rule.
(2) A rule may become effective immediately upon its
filing or on any subsequent date earlier than that established by subsection (a) if the agency establishes such an
effective date and finds that:
(i) it is required by constitution, statute, or court
order;
(ii) the rule only confers a benefit or removes a
restriction on the public or some segment thereof;
(iii) the rule only delays the effective date of another rule that is not yet effective; or
(iv) the earlier effective date is necessary because
of imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare.
(3) The finding and a brief statement of the reasons
therefor required by paragraph (2) must be made a part of
the rule. In any action contesting the effective date of a
rule made effective under paragraph (2), the burden is on
the agency to justify its finding.
(4) Each agency shall make a reasonable effort to
make known to persons who may be affected by it a rule
made effective before publication and indexing under this
subsection.
(c) This section does not relieve an agency from compliance with any provision of law requiring that some or all of its
rules be approved by other designated officials or bodies before
they become effective.
§ 3-116. [Special Provisionfor Certain Classes of Rules]
Except to the extent otherwise provided by any provision
of law, Sections 3-102 through 3-115 are inapplicable to:
(1) a rule concerning only the internal management
of an agency which does not directly and substantially affect the procedural or substantive rights or duties of any
segment of the public;
(2) a rule that establishes criteria or guidelines to be
used by the staff of an agency in performing audits, investigations, or inspections, settling commercial disputes, negotiating commercial arrangements, or in the defense,
prosecution, or settlement of cases, if disclosure of the criteria or guidelines would:
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(i) enable law violators to avoid detection;
(ii) facilitate disregard of requirements imposed
by law; or
(iii) give a clearly improper advantage to persons
who are in an adverse position to the state;
(3) a rule that only establishes specific prices to be
charged for particular goods or services sold by an agency;
(4) a rule concerning only the physical servicing,
maintenance, or care of agency owned or operated facilities
or property;
(5) a rule relating only to the use of a particular facility or property owned, operated, or maintained by the state
or any of its subdivisions, if the substance of the rule is adequately indicated by means of signs or signals to persons
who use the facility or property;
(6) a rule concerning only inmates of a correctional
or detention facility, students enrolled in an educational institution, or patients admitted to a hospital, if adopted by
that facility, institution, or hospital;
(7) a form whose contents or substantive requirements are prescribed by rule or statute, and instructions
for the execution or use of the form;
(8) an agency budget; [or]
(9) an opinion of the attorney general [; or] [.]
(10) [the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.]
§ 3-11Z [PetitionForAdoption of Rule]
Any person may petition an agency requesting the adoption
of a rule. Each agency shall prescribe by rule the form of the
petition and the procedure for its submission, consideration,
and disposition. Within [60] days after submission of a petition,
the agency shall either (i) deny the petition in writing, stating
its reasons therefor, (ii) initiate rule-making proceedings in accordance with this Chapter, or (iii) if otherwise lawful, adopt a
rule.
Chapter II Review of Agency Rules
§ 3-201. [Review by Agency]
At least [annually], each agency shall review all of its rules
to determine whether any new rule should be adopted. In conducting that review, each agency shall prepare a written report
summarizing its findings, its supporting reasons, and any pro-
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posed course of action. For each rule, the [annual] report must
include, at least once every [7] years, a concise statement of:
(1) the rule's effectiveness in achieving its objectives,
including a summary of any available data supporting the
conclusions reached;
(2) criticisms of the rule received during the previous
[7] years, including a summary of any petitions for waiver
of the rule tendered to the agency or granted by it; and
(3) alternative solutions to the criticisms and the reasons they were rejected or the changes made in the rule in
response to those criticisms and the reasons for the
changes. A copy of the [annual] report must be sent to the
[administrative rules review committee and the administrative rules counsel] and be available for public inspection.

[§ 3-202. [Review by Governor;Administrative Rules Counsel]
(a) To the extent the agency itself would have authority,
the governor may rescind or suspend all or a severable portion
of a rule of an agency. In exercising this authority, the governor shall act by an executive order that is subject to the provisions of this Act applicable to the adoption and effectiveness of
a rule.
(b) The governor may summarily terminate any pending
rule-making proceeding by an executive order to that effect,
stating therein the reasons for the action. The executive order
must be filed in the office of the [secretary of state], which
shall promptly forward a certified copy to the agency and the
[administrative rules editor]. An executive order terminating a
rule-making proceeding becomes effective on [the date it is
filed] and must be published in the next issue of the [administrative bulletin].
(c) There is created, within the office of the governor, an
[administrative rules counsel] to advise the governor in the execution of the authority vested under this Article. The governor
shall appoint the [administrative rules counsel] who shall serve
at the pleasure of the governor.]

[§ 3-203. [AdministrativeRules Review Committee]
There is created the ["administrative rules review committee"] of the [legislature]. The committee must be [bipartisan]
and composed of [3] senators appointed by the [president of the
senate] and [3] representatives appointed by the [speaker of the
house]. Committee members must be appointed within [30]
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days after the convening of a regular legislative session. The
term of office is [2] years while a member of the [legislature]
and begins on the date of appointment to the committee. While
a member of the [legislature], a member of the committee
whose term has expired shall serve until a successor is appointed. A vacancy on the committee may be filled at any time
by the original appointing authority for the remainder of the
term. The committee shall choose a chairman from its membership for a [2]-year term and may employ staff it considers
advisable.]
§ 3-204. [Review by Administrative Rules Review Committee]
(a) The [administrative rules review committee] shall selectively review possible, proposed, or adopted rules and prescribe appropriate committee procedures for that purpose. The
committee may receive and investigate complaints from members of the public with respect to possible, proposed, or adopted
rules and hold public proceedings on those complaints.
(b) Committee meetings must be open to the public. Subject to procedures established by the committee, persons may
present oral argument, data, or views at those meetings. The
committee may require a representative of an agency whose
possible, proposed, or adopted rule is under examination to attend a committee meeting and answer relevant questions. The
committee may also communicate to the agency its comments
on any possible, proposed, or adopted rule and require the
agency to respond to them in writing. Unless impracticable, in
advance of each committee meeting notice of the time and
place of the meeting and the specific subject matter to be considered must be published in the [administrative bulletin].
(c) The committee may recommend enactment of a statute to improve the operation of an agency. The committee may
also recommend that a particular rule be superseded in whole
or in part by statute. The [speaker of the house and the president of the senate] shall refer those recommendations to the
appropriate standing committees. This subsection does not preclude any committee of the legislature from reviewing a rule on
its own motion or recommending that it be superseded in whole
or in part by statute.
[(d) (1) If the committee objects to all or some portion of a
rule because the committee considers it to be beyond the
procedural or substantive authority delegated to the adopting agency, the committee may file that objection in the of-
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fice of the [secretary of state]. The filed objection must
contain a concise statement of the committee's reasons for
its action.
(2) The [secretary of state] shall affix to each objection a certification of the date and time of its filing and as
soon thereafter as practicable shall transmit a certified
copy thereof to the agency issuing the rule in question, the
[administrative rules editor, and the administrative rules
counsel]. The [secretary of state] shall also maintain a permanent register open to public inspection of all objections
by the committee.
(3) The [administrative rules editor] shall publish and
index an objection filed pursuant to this subsection in the
next issue of the [administrative bulletin] and indicate its
existence adjacent to the rule in question when that rule is
published in the [administrative code]. In case of a filed objection by the committee to a rule that is subject to the requirements of Section 2-101(g), the agency shall indicate
the existence of that objection adjacent to the rule in the
official compilation referred to in that subsection.
(4) Within [14] days after the filing of an objection by
the committee to a rule, the issuing agency shall respond in
writing to the committee. After receipt of the response,
the committee may withdraw or modify its objection.
[(5) After the filing of an objection by the committee
that is not subsequently withdrawn, the burden is upon the
agency in any proceeding for judicial review or for enforcement of the rule to establish that the whole or portion of
the rule objected to is within the procedural and substantive authority delegated to the agency.]
(6) The failure of the [administrative rules review
committee] to object to a rule is not an implied legislative
authorization of its procedural or substantive validity.]
(e) The committee may recommend to an agency that it
adopt a rule. [The committee may also require an agency to
publish notice of the committee's recommendation as a proposed rule of the agency and to allow public participation
thereon, according to the provisions of Sections 3-103 through 3104. An agency is not required to adopt the proposed rule.]
(f) The committee shall file an annual report with the
[presiding officer] of each house and the governor.
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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CIVIL ENFORCEMENT

Chapter I Judicial Review
§ 5-101. [Relationship Between this Act and Other Law on
JudicialReview and Other JudicialRemedies]
This Act establishes the exclusive means of judicial review
of agency action, but:
(1) The provisions of this Act for judicial review do
not apply to litigation in which the sole issue is a claim for
money damages or compensation and the agency whose action is at issue does not have statutory authority to determine the claim.
(2) Ancillary procedural matters, including intervention, class actions, consolidation, joinder, severance, transfer, protective orders, and other relief from disclosure of
privileged or confidential material, are governed, to the extent not inconsistent with this Act, by other applicable law.
(3) If the relief available under other sections of this
Act is not equal or substantially equivalent to the relief
otherwise available under law, the relief otherwise available and the related procedures supersede and supplement
this Act to the extent necessary for their effectuation. The
applicable provisions of this Act and other law must be
combined to govern a single proceeding or, if the court orders, 2 or more separate proceedings, with or without
transfer to other courts, but no type of relief may be sought
in a combined proceeding after expiration of the time limit
for doing so.
§ 5-102. [FinalAgency Action Reviewable]
(a) A person who qualifies under this Act regarding (i)
standing (Section 5-106), (ii) exhaustion of administrative remedies (Section 5-107), and (iii) time for filing the petition for review (Section 5-108), and other applicable provisions of law
regarding bond, compliance, and other pre-conditions is entitled
to judicial review of final agency action, whether or not the
person has sought judicial review of any related non-final
agency action.
(b) For purposes of this section and Section 5-103:
(1) "Final agency action" means the whole or a part
of any agency action other than non-final agency action;
(2) "Non-final agency action" means the whole or a
part of an agency determination, investigation, proceeding,
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hearing, conference, or other process that the agency intends or is reasonably believed to intend to be preliminary,
preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to
subsequent agency action of that agency or another agency.
§ 5-103. [Non-final Agency Action Reviewable]
A person is entitled to judicial review of non-final agency
action only if:
(1) it appears likely that the person will qualify
under Section 5-102 for judicial review of the related final
agency action; and
(2) postponement of judicial review would result in
an inadequate remedy or irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from postponement.
[Alternative A.]
§ 5-104. [Jurisdiction,Venue]
(a) The [trial court of general jurisdiction] shall conduct
judicial review.
(b) Venue is in the [district] [that includes the state capital] [where the petitioner resides or maintains a principal place
of business] unless otherwise provided by law.
[Alternative B.]
§ 5-104. [Jurisdiction,Venue]
(a) The [appellate court] shall conduct judicial review.
(b) Venue is in the [district] [that includes the state capital] [where the petitioner resides or maintains a principal place
of business] unless otherwise provided by law.
(c) If evidence is to be adduced in the reviewing court in
accordance with Section 5-114(a), the court shall appoint a [referee, master, trial court judge] for this purpose, having due regard for the convenience of the parties.
§ 5-105. [Form of Action]
Judicial review is initiated by filing a petition for review in
[the appropriate] court. A petition may seek any type of relief
available under Sections 5-101(3) and 5-117.
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§ 5-106. [Standing]
(a) The following persons have standing to obtain judicial
review of final or non-final agency action:
(1) a person to whom the agency action is specifically
directed;
(2) a person who was a party to the agency proceedings that led to the agency action;
(3) if the challenged agency action is a rule, a person
subject to that rule;
(4) a person eligible for standing under another provision of law; or
(5) a person otherwise aggrieved or adversely affected by the agency action. For purposes of this paragraph, no person has standing as one otherwise aggrieved
or adversely affected unless:
(i) the agency action has prejudiced or is likely to
prejudice that person;
(ii) that person's asserted interests are among
those that the agency was required to consider when it
engaged in the agency action challenged; and
(iii) a judgment in favor of that person would
substantially eliminate or redress the prejudice to that
person caused or likely to be caused by the agency action.
[(b) A standing committee of the legislature which is required to exercise general and continuing oversight over administrative agencies and procedures may petition for judicial
review of any rule or intervene in any litigation arising from
agency action.]
§ 5-10Z [Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies]
A person may file a petition for judicial review under this
Act only after exhausting all administrative remedies available
within the agency whose action is being challenged and within
any other agency authorized to exercise administrative review,
but:
(1) a petitioner for judicial review of a rule need not
have participated in the rule-making proceeding upon
which that rule is based, or have petitioned for its amendment or repeal;
(2) a petitioner for judicial review need not exhaust
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administrative remedies to the extent that this Act or any
other statute states that exhaustion is not required; or
(3) the court may relieve a petitioner of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies, to the
extent that the administrative remedies are inadequate, or
requiring their exhaustion would result in irreparable
harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from
requiring exhaustion.
§ 5-108. [Time for FilingPetitionfor Review]
Subject to other requirements of this Act or of another statue:
(1) A petition for judicial review of a rule may be
filed at any time, except as limited by Section 3-113(b).

§ 5-112. [Limitation on New Issues]
A person may obtain judicial review of an issue that was
not raised before the agency, only to the extent that:
(1) the agency did not have jurisdiction to grant an
adequate remedy based on a determination of the issue;
(2) the person did not know and was under no duty
to discover, or did not know and was under a duty to discover but could not reasonably have discovered, facts giving
rise to the issue;
(3) the agency action subject to judicial review is a
rule and the person has not been a party in adjudicative
proceedings which provided an adequate opportunity to
raise the issue;
(4) the agency action subject to judicial review is an
order and the person was not notified of the adjudicative
proceeding in substantial compliance with this Act; or
(5) the interests of justice would be served by judicial
resolution of an issue arising from:
(i) a change in controlling law occurring after the
agency action; or
(ii) agency action occurring after the person exhausted the last feasible opportunity for seeking relief
from the agency.
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§ 5-113. [JudicialReview of Facts Confined to Record for
JudicialReview and AdditionalEvidence Taken
Pursuantto Act]
Judicial review of disputed issues of fact must be confined
to the agency record for judicial review as defined in this Act,
supplemented by additional evidence taken pursuant to this
Act.
§ 5-114. [New Evidence Taken by Court or Agency Before
FinalDisposition]
(a) The court [(if Alternative B of Section 5-104 is
adopted), assisted by a referee, master, trial court judge as provided in Section 5-104(c),] may receive evidence, in addition to
that contained in the agency record for judicial review, only if
it relates to the validity of the agency action at the time it was
taken and is needed to decide disputed issues regarding:
(1) improper constitution as a decision-making body,
or improper motive or grounds for disqualification, of those
taking the agency action;
(2) unlawfulness of procedure or of decision-making
process; or
(3) any material fact that was not required by any
provision of law to be determined exclusively on an agency
record of a type reasonably suitable for judicial review.
(b) The court may remand a matter to the agency, before
final disposition of a petition for review, with directions that
the agency conduct fact-finding and other proceedings the court
considers necessary and that the agency take such further action on the basis thereof as the court directs, if:
(1) the agency was required by this Act or any other
provision of law to base its action exclusively on a record of
a type reasonably suitable for judicial review, but the
agency failed to prepare or preserve an adequate record;
(2) the court finds that (i) new evidence has become
available that relates to the validity of the agency action at
the time it was taken, that one or more of the parties did
not know and was under no duty to discover, or did not
know and was under a duty to discover but could not reasonably have discovered, until after the agency action, and
(ii) the interests of justice would be served by remand to
the agency;
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(3) the agency improperly excluded or omitted evidence from the record; or
(4) a relevant provision of law changed after the
agency action and the court determines that the new provision may control the outcome.
§ 5-115. [Agency Record for JudicialReview-Contents,
Preparation,Transmittal, Cost]
] days after service of the petition, or
(a) Within [within further time allowed by the court or by other provision
of law, the agency shall transmit to the court the original or a
certified copy of the agency record for judicial review of the
agency action, consisting of any agency documents expressing
the agency action, other documents identified by the agency as
having been considered by it before its action and used as a basis for its action, and any other material described in this Act as
the agency record for the type of agency action at issue, subject
to the provisions of this section.
(f) Additions to the record pursuant to Section 5-114 must
be made as ordered by the court.
(g) The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record.
§ 5-116. [Scope of Review; Groundsfor Invalidity]
(a) Except to the extent that this Act or another statute
provides otherwise:
(1) The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of
agency action is on the party asserting invalidity; and
(2) The validity of agency action must be determined
in accordance with the standards of review provided in this
section, as applied to the agency action at the time it was
taken.
(b) The court shall make a separate and distinct ruling on
each material issue on which the court's decision is based.
(c) The court shall grant relief only if it determines that a
person seeking judicial relief has been substantially prejudiced
by any one or more of the following:
(1) The agency action, or the statute or rule on which
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or
as applied.
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(2) The agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any provision of law.
(3) The agency has not decided all issues requiring
resolution.
(4) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law.
(5) The agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure
or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure.
(6) The persons taking the agency action were improperly constituted as a decision-making body, motivated
by an improper purpose, or subject to disqualification.
(7) The agency action is based on a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported
by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court, which includes the agency
record for judicial review, supplemented by any additional
evidence received by the court under this Act.
(8) The agency action is:
(i) outside the range of discretion delegated to
the agency by any provision of law;
(iv)
cious.]

[otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capri-

